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The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic
Surveillance: Title III, The Fourth Amendment,
and the Dread Scott Decision*
CLIFFORD

S.

FISHMAN**

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681
empowers law enforcement officials to seek, and judges to issue, warrants
authorizing the interception of wire and oral communications 2 without the
knowledge or consent of participants to those conversations. 3 The legislation
was controversial when enacted 4 and remains so. 5 No other form of official
*P o rtions of this article are adapted from C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING (1978),
reproduced with the permission of the publisher, The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester,
New York.
**Associate Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America; former
Executive Assistant District Attorney, New York City Special Narcotics Prosecutor's Office; A.B.,
University of Rochester, 1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). Prior to the enactment of Title III, the law governing official
eavesdropping was rife with inconsistencies, and its use varied widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See
generally S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).

2. The terms "wire communication," "oral communication," and "intercept" are defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2510(0), (21, (4) (1976). For a discussion of "wire communication" and "oral communication," see
Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title III, Consent, and the
Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41, 54-66 (1977). For an extensive discussion of the
statutory definition of "intercept," see notes 70-78 & accompanying text infra. As used in this article,
"eavesdropping" includes the interception of "wire communications" (wiretapping) and "oral communications" (bugging).
3. Certain types of eavesdropping, such as particular activities of switchboard operators, employees of
communications common carriers, and the Federal Communication Commission (F.C.C.) were exempted
from the warrant requirement of Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)-(b) (1976). Title III authorizes law
enforcement officials and private citizens to transmit, overhear and/or record conversations so long as one
participant to the conversation consents in advance and the conversation is not being intercepted for an
unlawful or tortious purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1976). For a detailed discussion of consensual
interceptions, see Fishman, supra note 2, at 41-98.
In addition, electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801), is exempt from the
provisions of Title III. 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 l(2)(a)(ii), (2)(e) and (2)(f) (Supp. 1979). In emergency situations,
Title III empowers law enforcement officials to intercept communications without a warrant and then
obtain retroactive judicial approval. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976).
4. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-85, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 2112, 2222 (separate dissenting views of Senators Long and Hart, Senator Hart, Senator Burdick &
Senator Fong). See also Schwartz, The Legitimization of ElectronicEavesdropping: The Politicsof 'Law and
Order.' 67 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1969); Spritzer, ElectronicSurveillance by Leave of the Magistrate:The Case
in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969).
5. When Congress enacted Title III, it also created a National Commission for the Review of Federal
and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 804, 82 Stat.
223 (1968) [hereinafter cited as National Wiretap Commission]. After extensive surveys, studies and
hearings, the Commission issued its report in 1976, in which a majority of the commissioners endorsed
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surveillance is as drastic an intrusion upon our thoughts, words, or lives.
Many fear that "[w]e are becoming a society that must exist in constant
hazard from official snooping," and that "[w]hatever incidental good flows
from this invasion of privacy is submerged by the growing appearance of
'6
police surveillance so typical of totalitarian states."
Congress enacted Title III with four specific goals in mind. First, it sought
to provide law enforcement officials with a much needed weapon in their fight
against crime, particularly organized crime. 7 Second, it sought to safeguard
the privacy of wire and oral communications 8 and, in particular, the privacy
of innocent persons. 9 Third, it endeavored to satisfy the procedural and
substantive requirements previously enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Berger v. New York' 0 and Katz v. United States," as constitutional prerequisites to a valid eavesdropping statute.' 2 Finally, it attempted to define "on a
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception
13
of wire and oral communications may be authorized."'
Title III. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC

REPORT]. A substantial number of commissioners, however, concluded that Title III had failed to serve the
purposes it was intended to further, and called for its repeal. Id. at 177, 179-92 (minority report of Sen.
Abourezk, Reps. Kastenmeier and Seiberling, and Prof. Westin) & 213-17 (separate statement of Prof.
Westin). See also H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977); Margolis, Human
Rights Commentator, 50 CONN. B.J. 559 (1976).
6. United States v. Kline, 366 F. Supp. 994, 996-97 (D.D.C. 1973) (Gesell, J.).
7. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 211-12 (1968) (legislative findings introducing Title III); S.
REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 70, 89, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2157,
2177. Some scholars urge that the metaphor "war on crime" carries within it an inherent denigration of
individual liberties. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 43-45.
8. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §801(b), 82 Stat. 211-12 (1968); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 89, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2177. Hence, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1976) prohibits all
interceptions of communications not expressly permitted by the statute.
9. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §801(d), 82 Stat. 211-12 (1968); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 89, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2177.
10. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger delineated the constitutional prerequisites to the issuance of an
eavesdropping warrant: (1) there must be probable cause to believe that a particular offense has been or is
being committed; (2) the conversations to be intercepted must be particularly described; (3) eavesdropping
must be limited in duration; (4) extensions may be granted only on a new showing of probable cause; (5)
eavesdropping must terminate once the sought-for evidence has been obtained; (6) there must be notice
unless a showing of exigent circumstances is made; and (7) there must be a return on the warrant. Id. at
54-60.
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court reiterated that agents must obtain a warrant authorizing a
search and seizure by electronic surveillance. Id. at 354. For a discussion of the effect of Berger and Katz on
prior law, see Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 296 (1968).
12. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 74-75, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS
2112, 2161-62.
13. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b), 82 Stat. 211-12 (1968); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 66, 89,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153, 2177. States were authorized either to
prohibit eavesdropping or to enact statutes at least as restrictive as the federal statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)
(1976); S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 98-99, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 2112,
2187. Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted such statutes. The respective statutes of
the 23 jurisdictions are: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3001 to 3014 (eff. Oct. 1, 1978) (formerly §§ 13-1051
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In most respects, Title III has been more than adequate in accomplishing
these goals. 14 The statute controls when eavesdropping warrants may be
issued, 15 and the circumstances under which resultant evidence may be
utilized.16 Yet, although Congress carefully defined what must be done before
and after conversations are intercepted, it did little to define what is required
during the period that police agents are intercepting conversations occurring
over the tapped telephone or in the bugged premises. On the critical question
of how extensively monitoring agents are permitted to listen to and record
conversations once a warrant has been issued, the statute contains a single
ambiguous passage, commonly referred to as the "minimization provision."' 7
Unfortunately, there is virtually no legislative history to which courts may
look in construing this provision. 18 Yet, the issue of what agents monitoring a
wiretap or bug may or may not listen to, and how their performance should be
measured, is of vital importance if privacy is to be protected and constitutional prerequisites are to be satisfied.
The confusion surrounding the minimization issue is, perhaps, inevitable,
given the procedural and conceptual difficulties inherent in applying fourth
amendment concepts to the electronic surveillance of communications. First,
there are substantial differences between the nature and scope of searches
authorized by a search warrant and searches authorized by an eavesdropping
warrant. A search warrant application must establish probable cause to
believe that particularly described items will be found in specified premises 19
to 1061); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-15-101 to 104, 18-9-301 to 310; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-187
to 189, 54-41a to 41s; Del. Code Ann. Title 11 §§ 1335, 1336; D.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-541 to 556; Fla. Stat.
Ann. §§ 934.01-.10; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-3001 to 3010; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-2514 to 2519; Md. Ann.
Code CJ §§ 10-401 to 408; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 § 99; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 626A.01-.23; Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 86-701 to 707; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 179.410-.515, 200.610-.690; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 570-A:1 to
AAII; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:156A-1 to 26; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40A-12-I.1 to .10; N.Y. Crim. Pro. L. §§
700.05 .70; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 133.723-.727; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-5.1-1 to 16; S.D. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 23-13A-1 to 11; Va. Code Ann, §§ 19.2-61 to 70; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.73.030-100; Wis. Stat.
Ann. §§ 968.27-.33.
The preceding list was compiled in Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps:
Minimization, Amendment, Sealing and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 92, 94 n.9 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Post-Authorization Problems].
14. During eight years as a prosecutor in the New York County District Attorney's Office and Special
Narcotics Prosecutor's Office, the author drafted the application for and supervised the execution of
approximately forty wiretaps and bugs. Despite the cogent arguments of critics of electronic surveillance,
see notes 4-5 supra, the author is convinced that court authorized eavesdropping is essential to effective law
enforcement. The reader should, of course, evaluate this article with the author's experience and biases in
mind.
15. See notes 30-49 & accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 50-54 & accompanying text infra.
17. The minimization provision requires every eavesdropping warrant to state explicitly that "the
authorization to intercept . . . shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter ....
- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)
(1976).
18. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report merely repeats the statutory language. See S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 4 at 103, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2192.
19. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969).
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and, once issued, authorizes a single, overt entry and search of these premises.
If the sought-for evidence is not found, no second entry or search is permitted
unless a new warrant, supported by a new showing of probable cause, is
obtained. In contrast, an eavesdropping application must establish probable
cause to believe that particularly described communications, which have not
yet taken place, will be seized over a specific telephone or telegraph, or at
another specified location. 20 On this single showing of probable cause, an
eavesdropping warrant may authorize a series of surreptitious intrusions for
up to thirty days, 21 subject only to discretionary periodic review by the judge
22
issuing the warrant.
Second, problems arise in defining the scope of police conduct authorized
by an eavesdropping warrant, and the remedy to be applied if that conduct
oversteps what has been authorized. When police are executing a search
warrant, they usually know as soon as they see an object whether it falls
within the ambit of items subject to seizure. If the police seize items not
specified in the warrant or found in plain view, such items are not admissible
in evidence and must be restored to their lawful owner. 23 On the other hand,
when a wiretap or bug is being executed, the listener often does not know
whether a conversation contains the evidence he is seeking until after he has
heard it in its entirety. There is no way to "restore" a conversation, or the
nonpertinent parts, to its participants. Moreover, it is uncertain whether
effective remedies are available to the participants, 24 and whether any
practical deterrents to excessive overhearing exist. Although Title III contains a statutory exclusionary rule25 and sets forth the grounds and procedures for the suppression of evidence, 26 these provisions do not deal adequately with the discrete and unique questions raised by eavesdropping. Indeed, the
legislative history of the exclusionary provision indicates that it was not
intended "to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search
27
and seizure law."
The third problem in applying fourth amendment concepts to eavesdropping is defining what is meant by a "search" for, or the "seizure" of, a
conversation. This problem is compounded by the failure of Congress to
define adequately the statutory term "intercept," a term that is central both to
28
the minimization provision and to the entire statute.
20. See notes 32-33 & accompanying text infra.
21. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
22. See notes 45 & 186-93 & accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g.. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
24. Title III creates a civil cause of action for victims of illegal eavesdropping. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1976). This remedy, however, is unlikely to afford any real relief to one complaining of excessive
monitoring pursuant to an apparently valid eavesdropping warrant. See note 212 infra.
25. See note 53 infra.
26. See notes 54-56 & accompanying text infra.
27. S.REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 96, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112,
2185.
28. See notes 61-62, 70-78 & accompanying text infra.
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Judicial treatment of problems raised by the minimization requirement
lacks uniformity. Courts often have approached these questions in terms of
convenient labels rather than careful analyses. The most recent example is
Scott v. United States, 29 where the Supreme Court comes dangerously close to
eviscerating the minimization provision altogether.
This article addresses the problems raised by the Title III minimization
requirement with particular emphasis on the Supreme Court's decision in
Scott. Section I outlines the provisions of Title III that govern the issuance of
eavesdropping warrants and the use of derivative evidence. Section II
discusses the minimization provision and the definitional problems it presents. Section III analyzes judicial treatment of the minimization provision in
light of Scott, and factors that have been held to affect a monitoring agent's
ability to minimize interceptions. Section IV discusses judicial approaches to
minimization litigation with respect to the problems of standing, guidelines
for minimization hearings, and appropriate remedies. Finally, Section V
offers alternative solutions to the difficult problems raised by the Supreme

Court's interpretation of the minimization requirement.
I. TITLE III RESTRICTIONS ON EAVESDROPPING AND USE OF
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE
A. OBTAINING AN EAVESDROPPING WARRANT

An eavesdropping warrant is in essence a search warrant and must comply
with fourth amendment requirements. 30 Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196831 permits the issuance of eavesdropping

warrants only on probable cause 32 and requires the application and warrant to

contain a particular description of the evidence sought.33 The statute,
29. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).

30. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520 (1976).
32. The application for an eavesdropping warrant must establish probable cause to believe "that an
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense," 18 U.S.C. §
2518(3)(a) (1976); see also id. § 2518(l)(b)(i), (iv). It must also establish probable cause to believe that
..particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained" through the use of eavesdropping on
a specific phone or in specific premises. Id. § 2518(3) (b), (d). "[T]he order will link up specific person,
specific offense and specific place. Together they are intended to meet the test of the Constitution that
electronic surveillance techniques be used only under the most precise and discriminate circumstances,
which fully comply with the requirement of particularity .... S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 102,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2191 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
58-60 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1967)).
33. The application and warrant must specify:
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however, does more than merely parallel the language of the fourth amendment. In its effort to comply with fourth amendment standards enunciated in
Berger v. New York 34 and Katz v. United States35 and to protect the privacy of
innocent conversations and innocent persons, 36 Congress included within the
statute several procedural and substantive safeguards, many of which are not
applicable to warrants that authorize only a physical search and seizure.
These provisions restrict the use of eavesdropping and the use of intercepted
37
communications and derivative evidence.
Title III specifies the law enforcement officials empowered to seek an
eavesdropping warrant, 38 the appropriate judges to whom applications may
be submitted, 39 the enforcement agencies empowered to execute eavesdropping warrants, 40 and the types of criminal investigations in which eavesdropping may be used. 4 1 An application must satisfy the judge that "normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 42 The judge to whom an
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted; (b) the
nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority
to intercept is granted; [and] (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought
to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates ...
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a)-(c) (1976); see also id. § 2518(I)(b). Title III provisions governing the application
and warrant are discussed extensively in C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING §§ 41-127
(1978).
34. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. See notes 7-12 & accompanying text supra.
37. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 89, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD,NEWS 2112,
2177.
38. Only the attorney general or a specially designated assistant attorney general may authorize federal
applications. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). State applications may be authorized by "[t]he
principal
prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision
thereof," if empowered to do so by state law. Id. § 2516(2).
[These] provision[s] centralize . . . in a publicly responsible official subject to the political
process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance
techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility that divergent practices might develop.
Should abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. [These]
provision[s] in [themselves] should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses will
happen.
S.REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 97, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2185.
39. Federal warrants may be issued only by district or circuit court judges. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(al
(1976). State warrants may be issued only by "a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction" who is
authorized by state statute to do so. Id. § 2510(9)(b). The Senate report notes that "[e]xisting Federal
search warrant practice permits U.S. Commissioners and city mayors to issue warrants. . . .This practice
is too permissive for the interception of wire or oral communications." S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at
91, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2179. The restrictions in 18 US.C. § 2510(9)
are "intended to guarantee responsible judicial participation in the decision to use these techniques." Id.
40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(7), 2516 (1976). The application and warrant must specify the agency that
will execute the warrant. Id. § 2518(1)(a), (4)(d).
41. The crimes against which eavesdropping may be used are set forth in 18 U.S.C. §2516 (1976). They
include federal crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year such as espionage,
sabotage, treason, bribery, interstate commerce violations, gambling, narcotics, fraud and conspiracy. See
id.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), (3)(c) (1976). In addition, the application must inform the issuing judge of
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application is submitted is authorized to demand additional information
before acting on the application 43 and is empowered to reject the application
even if it complies fully with statutory requirements. 44 The judge also has the
power to include within the warrant a requirement that periodic reports be
made disclosing what steps have been taken toward accomplishing the

permissible objective and the necessity for continued surveillance. 45 The
application and warrant must specify the period of time during which
interceptions are to be conducted 46 and whether interception of more than one
incriminating conversation is authorized. 47 Interceptions must cease when the
authorized objective has been attained.4 8 Special provisions govern extensions
49
of the initial warrant.
In addition to the provisions governing procedures for obtaining an
eavesdropping warrant, the statute contains provisions regulating how intercepted conversations are to be preserved, safeguarded and stored; 50 when and
all known previous eavesdropping applications "involving any of the same persons, facilities or places
specified in the application, and the action taken . . . on each such application ....
" Id. § 2518(i)(e).
43. Id. § 2518(2).
44. Title III provides that if the application complies with all statutory requirements, "the judge may
enter" an eavesdropping warrant (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). The "provision recognizes
that the judge may properly deny the application altogether, or grant it as suitably modified." S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 4, at 102, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2191. Compare FED.
R. CRiM. P. 41(c)(1), which provides that if an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains the
required showing of probable cause, the magistrate "shall issue" the warrant. Nevertheless most witnesses
who testified before the National Wiretap Commission, including most judicial witnesses, concluded that
"[ilf the statute provides for surveillance in the investigation of the offense, and the application is sufficient,
then the judge has an obligation to issue the [warrant]." NWC REPORT, supra note 5, at 77.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1976). "Such reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require."
Id.
The reports are intended as a check on the continuing need to conduct the surveillance. At
any time the judge is convinced the need is no longer established, he may order the
surveillance discontinued . . . .This provision will serve to insure that surveillance is not
unthinkingly or automatically continued without due consideration.
S.REP. No. 1097, supra note 4. at 104, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2193.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(d) (1976)(application) and id. § 2518(4)(e) (warrant). The warrant must be
executed as soon as is practicable. Id. § 2518(5). Although Title III authorizes warrants of up to 30 days
duration, id., most federal warrants permit surveillance for only 15 or 20 days, and some state statutes
restrict the duration of warrants to shorter periods. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41(e)(1 1)
(West Supp. 1978)(10 days); GA. CODE. ANN. § 26-3004(e) (1978)(20 days); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626A 06(4)(h) (West Supp. 1979)(10 days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (West Supp. 1979)(20 days).
See also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 991(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2518()(d), (4)(e) (1976).
48 Id. § 2518(5).
49. See d. § 2518(l)(f), (5).
50 See ud. § 2518(8)(a), which provides, inter alia, that intercepted conversations shall be recorded on
tape or on wire "in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations," that
"[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the [warrant], or extensions thereof such recordings shall be made
available to the [issuing judge] and sealed under his directions," and that the recordings may not be
destroyed except on court order, "and in any event shall be kept for ten years." For an extensive discussion
of this provision, see FISHMAN, supra note 33, at §§ 145, 187, 190-97. See also Post-Authorization Problems,
supra note 13, at 139-41; Note, Judicial Sealing of Tape Recordings Under Title III-A Need for
Clarification, 15 AI. CRIm. L. REV. 89 (1977).
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under what circumstances intercepted conversations or derivative evidence
may be disclosed or used; 51 who is to receive notice that eavesdropping was
52
conducted; and when such notice is to be served.
B. SUPPRESSING INTERCEPTED CONVERSATIONS OR DERIVATIVE
EVIDENCE

The statute also includes a general exclusionary rule 53 and sets forth three
grounds upon which an individual may move to suppress intercepted
conversations or derivative evidence. 54 Most suppression litigation has fo51. The contents of intercepted communications and derivative evidence may be disclosed, used, or
testified to only by a law enforcement official who is authorized to intercept such communications, and
only "to the extent that such [disclosure, use or testimony] is appropriate to the proper performance of his
official duties." 18 U.S.C. § 2517(l)-(3) (1976). Privileged communications are specifically protected from
unauthorized disclosure. Id. § 2517(4). Finally, if conversations concerning crimes other than those
specified in the warrant are intercepted, such conversations or derivative evidence may be testified to only if
an appropriate judge first finds that the conversations "were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the
provisions of" Title III. Id. § 2517(5). See FISHMAN, supra note 33, at §§ 161-72 (analysis of § 2517(5));
Comment, Subsequent Use of Electronic Surveillance Interceptions and the Plain View Doctrine: Fourth
Amendment Limitations on the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 9 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 529, 544-53 (1976);
Post-Authorization Problems, supra note 13, at 92, 126-39; Schwartz, The Legitimization of Electronic
Eavesdropping: The Politics of 'Law and Order,' 67 MICH. L. REV. 455, 463-66 (1969).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), (9) (1976). See FISHMAN, supra note 33, at §§ 203-13; Post-Authorization
Problems. supra note 13, at 141-54.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976) provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in
violation of [Title III].
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976) provides:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing or proceeding. . . may move to suppress the
contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on
the grounds that-(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the [eavesdropping
warrant] under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was
not made in conformity with the [eavesdropping warrant].
"Aggrieved person" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) as "a person who was a party to any intercepted
wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed." The phrase "party to
an, intercepted communication" is basically self-explanatory although one court has expanded it
somewhat. See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 506 (9th Cir. 1973)(message sent at third party's
direction sufficient to confer standing on third party to object to interception), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920
(1974). The phrase "person against whom the interception was directed" was interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), as including only someone whose premises was
bugged or whose telephone was tapped. Id. at 394 U.S. 176-80.
The phrase "trial, hearing or proceeding" generally does not include grand jury proceedings. S. REP.
No. 1097, supra note 4, at 106, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2195. A grand
jury witness, however, is entitled to refuse to answer questions that are based upon illegal eavesdropping by
which he was aggrieved. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). Concerning the procedures by %%
hich
a grand jury witness' claim is to be litigated, see FISHMAN, supra note 33, at §§ 223-37; Comment.
Intercepted Communications: "Just Cause"for Refusing to Answer the Questions of the Grand Jury, 2Q U
MIAMI L. REV. 334 (1975); Comment, Claiming Illegal Electronic Surveillance: An Examination of 18
U.S.C. § 3504(a)(I), 11 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 632 (1976).
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cused on the first ground, the unlawful interception of communications. What
constitutes unlawful interception for purposes of suppression was addressed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Giordano55 and United States v.
Chavez,56 in which Attorney General Mitchell had failed to comply with Title
III's application authorization provisions.5 7 In both cases the Court held that
although Congress mandated suppression if "central" eavesdropping provisions of Title III were violated,5 8 suppression was not required if less
significant provisions of the statute were violated.5 9 Thus, once it is established that a provision of Title III has been violated, a court then must
determine whether Congress intended that provision to serve as an integral
part of the legislative scheme. 60 If the provision plays a decisive role in
effectuating Congress' intent to restrict the utilization of surveillance, 61
suppression is mandated. If the provision does not play a "central role,"
62
suppression need not follow.

II. THE MINIMIZATION PROVISION: SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND
INTERCEPTIONS

A. REQUIREMENTS OF THE MINIMIZATION PROVISION

Title III offers little guidance to law enforcement officials or judges
concerning which conversations may be intercepted once a warrant is issued.
The statute merely provides that "[e]very order and extension thereof shall
55. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
56. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
57. In Giordano,a Justice Department official other than one of those specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)
had authorized an eavesdropping application; the Court held the warrant invalid and the resultant
conversations "unlawfully intercepted." In Chavez, an appropriate official had authorized the application,
but a different official was identified in the application and warrant as the authorizing official. Although
this violated 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(a) and (4)(d), the Court concluded that the warrant was nonetheless valid
and the resultant conversations were not subject to suppression. See FISHMAN, supra note 33, at §§ 42-46,
253; Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under Title III: Another Dissent to Giordano and Chavez,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 750 (1975).
58. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527-28 (1974).
59. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974).
60. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974).
61. Id. at 527. Among the provisions of Title III that have been or are likely to be considered "central,"
and that require suppression when violated, are the following: 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (designation of
authorizing official); § 2516(l)(a)-(g)(designation of offenses); § 2518(1)(b)(i)-(iii) & (3)(a), (b),
(d)(establishment of probable cause); § 2518(l)(c) & (3)(c)(inadequacy of normal investigative procedures);
and § 2518(1 )(e)(notification of prior applications). See United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
62. Provisons held not "central" to Title III include 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(a) & (4)(d) (identifying
authorizing official in application and warrant), see United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (identifying those whose conversations are to be intercepted), see United States v.
Donovan, 420 U.S.413 (1977); § 2518(8)(d) (specifying procedures for inventory and notice), see United
States v Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
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contain a provision that the authorization to intercept. . . shall be conducted
in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
,"63 Despite the lack
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter ..
of legislative history, 64 this provision apparently was included in Title III as
part of the congressional effort to protect the privacy of innocent persons 65
and to comply with the constitutional prerequisites enunciated in Berger v.
New York. 66 Yet, the minimization provision does not specify how these goals
are to be accomplished.
Although the statute requires that each warrant include a minimization
provision, it does not specify what a warrant's minimization clause must
contain. Several courts have upheld the validity of warrants that did not
contain such a clause. 67 In most cases, there has been a minimization clause
consisting only of a general restatement of the statutory language. Although
some courts have expressed a preference for warrants containing specific
minimization instructions rather than a general directive, these same courts
have acknowledged that it is usually difficult to formulate precise instructions
concerning what the monitoring officers can and cannot listen to and record
68
before they know who and what they will be overhearing.
The fundamental problem has been defining what the minimization
provision requires and how law enforcement officials should attempt to
comply with it. The thrust of the provision is that conversations that are
irrelevant to an investigation should be treated differently from conversations
that are relevant. For example, a monitor should either not listen to, or only
spot check, a conversation between spouses concerning intimate family
matters; he should, however, listen to and record in full a conversation
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
64. See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
65. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
66. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See note 10 supra. See also text at notes 75-76 infra.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 860-62 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Cirillo, 499
F.2d 872, 878-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224,
327 N.E.2d 819, 842-43 (1975). In these cases, the applications reflected awareness of the need to minimize
interception of nonpertinent conversations and the monitoring officers attempted to avoid intercepting
such conversations. See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 132 n.3 (1978); note 97 & accompanying
text i nfra. But see State v. Luther, 116 R.I. 28, 351 A.2d 594 (1976).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 980
(1976); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 852 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524,
532 n.26 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass 224, 327
N.E.2d 819, 826 (1975).
Three federal courts, confronted with cases in which specific minimization instructions contained in a
warrant were ignored, reached different conclusions as to what sanctions should be imposed. In United
States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972), the instructions were ignored because the monitors were
never informed of them; all conversations intercepted pursuant to the tap were suppressed. In United States
v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1140-41 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977), only those
conversations intercepted in violation of the specific provision were suppressed. In United States %
Diadone, 558 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978), where the issuing judge was
informed that the provisions could not be adhered to and permitted the monitors to disregard them, no
conversations were suppressed.
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between identified participants in the criminal scheme under investigation.
Clearly, avoiding interception of all irrelevant conversations is impossible. 69
The distinction between conversations that are "subject to interception" and
conversations that are "not otherwise subject to interception," however,
sometimes has been difficult to draw. 70
Perhaps the most difficult problem in interpreting the minimization
provision is applying fourth amendment terminology to eavesdropping-how
does one distinguish between the "search" for a conversation and the
.'seizure" of it? When the police execute a search warrant, they necessarily
examine many objects while searching for the items particularly described in
the warrant, but they are said to have seized only those things that they take
into their physical custody. When officers monitor a wiretap or bug, on the
other hand, the distinction between "hearing" a conversation and "seizing" it
is more metaphysical than actual.
The definitional problem is compounded because Title III does not refer to
searches for or seizures of communications, but rather to "interceptions."
"Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." 71 The phrase "aural acquisition" is extremely ambiguous-has a
conversation been "intercepted" when it has been overheard but not recorded;
when it has been recorded but not overheard; when it has been both recorded
and overheard; or only when, after it has been recorded and/or overheard, its
contents are later disclosed? The Supreme Court has yet to consider these
questions, 72 and few federal courts have commented upon them. 73 Although
one state court has held that listening to a conversation without recording it
does not constitute an interception, 74 most state courts have not addressed
69. See notes 85-87, 158-69 & accompanying text infra.
70. Under a permissive approach, monitors are authorized to intercept a conversation unless, at the
outset of the conversation, it is apparent that no information helpful to the attainment of the authorized
objective will be obtained. Under a restrictive approach, monitors are not authorized to intercept a
conversation unless, at the outset of the conversation, it is probable that information necessary to the
attainment of the authorized objective will be obtained. The particular circumstances of each case
determine which approach is appropriate. See text at notes 151-71 infra.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976).
72. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), argued that overhearing or
recording a conversation constituted only a "search," but not a "seizure," of the conversation. Justice
Harlan further concluded that a conversation was "seized" only if,
after the initial overhearing and/or
recording, some use was made of it by the eavesdropper. Id. at 98 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). But see Bynum v.
United States, 423 U.S. 952 (1975) (Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and Marshall concurred,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
73 See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 105 n.205-06 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(that Secret Service
agents maintained and occasionally spot-checked White House tapes prior to public knowledge of their
existence did not constitute interception of contents): United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 657-59 (5th Cir.
9
1 76)(seizure of tape from defendant and subsequent playing of it did not constitute interception); United
State, v Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 502 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d
Cit.). c'rt.denied 423 U.S. 952 (1975) (declined to address interception/seizure issue).
74. Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 289 (1975).
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this issue. Furthermore, most state statutes either echo the Title III definition
of "intercept" or provide no definition at all.
The definition of "intercept" is critical because it affects the constitutionality of Title III. Among the reasons that the Court in Berger held New
York's eavesdropping statute unconstitutional was the determination that it
failed to limit unauthorized invasions of privacy, thus sanctioning the use of
electronic devices to effect a general search. 75 The absence of a provision
requiring that warrants specify the conversations to be monitored in effect
gave agents "a roving commission to seize any and all conversations." 76 The
particularity 77 and minimization provisions appear to be designed to avoid
giving a similar "roving commission" under Title III. Yet, if authorities can
overhear or record a conversation without "intercepting" it, the particularity
and minimization provisions are rendered ineffective, and Title III, like the
statute condemned in Berger, fails to protect against unauthorized invasions
of privacy. Until a more adequate definition of "intercept" wins general
acceptance, 78 analogies to traditional search and seizure concepts do little
more than compare substance to a vacuum.
B. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES

Given the definitional and conceptual difficulties inherent in
tion provision, it is not surprising that courts have endorsed
procedures to "minimize" the interception of communications
subject to interception: extrinsic, intrinsic, dual recorder, and
On occasion, more than one procedure has been used in
eavesdropping warrant.

the minimizafour separate
not otherwise
after-the-fact.
executing an

1. Extrinsic minimization
Extrinsic minimization limits the time period during which monitoring is
conducted. Although Title III authorizes eavesdropping warrants of up to
75. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
76. Id. at 59.
77. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.

78. Commentators have noted the inadequacy of the statutory definition of "intercept." See PostAuthorization Problems, supra note 13, at 99-106; Note, Minimization of Wire Interceptions: Presearch
Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1415-16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Minimization of Wire Interceptions];Note, Minimization: In Search of Standards, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 60,
68-71 (1973).

New York State's eavesdropping statute avoids the ambiguities of Title III, by defining an "intercepted
communication" as one that has been "intentionally overheard or recorded," without the consent of a
participant, "by means of any instrument, device or equipment." N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 700.05(3)
(McKinney 1971). This definition, which in effect declares that there is no distinction between a "search"
for a conversation and the "seizure" of it, makes explicit what is implicit in Berger. Coupled with the
particularity and minimization provisions, it also better implements the congressional intention to protect
"the privacy of innocent persons." Other substantially similar statutes are: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-3005 (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41(a)(2) (West Supp. 1Q78); GA. CODE ANN. §
26-3001(a) (1972).
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thirty days' duration, current federal practice is to issue warrants valid for
only fifteen or twenty days.7 9 Another extrinsic minimization practice is the
termination of interceptions prior to a warrant's expiration,8 0 or the restriction of eavesdropping to certain hours each day.8 1 This latter practice, while
appropriate in the context of gambling investigations, may not be effective in
2
other situations8
2. Intrinsic minimization
Intrinsic minimization attempts to screen out nonpertinent conversations
while they are taking place.8 3 Two variations on intrinsic minimization have
emerged from the case law. The first requires monitoring officers to make a
reasonable, good-faith effort to avoid both listening to and recording nonpertinent conversations.8 4 If, during the first portion of the conversation,8 5 the
79. See note 46 supra.
80. "[O]ne of the most obvious ways to minimize is to use the tap only for a short time." United States
v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.) (twenty-day tap terminated after nine-and-one-half days), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976). See United States v. Losing, 539 F.2d 1174, 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1976)
(twenty-day tap terminated after twelve or thirteen days), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Lawson v.
State, 236 Ga. 770, 770, 225 S.E.2d 258, 260 (twenty-day tap terminated after two days), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976). Accord, United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977) (tap terminated after
twelve days), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978). Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 98, 338 A.2d 284, 290 (1975)
(tap limited to two weeks). See also United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 195 n.3 (1974) (original warrant
renewed after twenty days, interceptions ceased after thirty days). But see Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d
15, 19-20 (Fla. 1974)(warrant authorized taps on three phones; early termination of interception on one
phone did not excuse total interception of all conversations over other phones for duration of warrant).
81. E.g., State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 527, 291 A.2d 825, 829 (tap limited for use between hours of 10:00
a.m. and 3:00 p.m. daily, except Sundays), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972). This approach has been
incorporated into New Jersey's eavesdropping statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 156A-12(f) (West Supp.
1978). See also People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 247, 360 N.E.2d 935, 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 260
(1976)(although four successive thirty-day wiretaps authorized interceptions for total of 2,880 hours,
eavesdropping conducted for only 1,210 hours). See also Post-Authorization Problems, supra note 13, at
119-20.
82. For example, gambling-related conversations over a bookmaker's phone will generally occur only in
the hours before, during and after a day's races. On the other hand, the telephone utilized by an active
narcotics dealer may be used for drug-related conversations virtually around the clock.
83. See generally Post-Authorization Problems, supra note 13, at 119, 121-22.
84. Until the Scott decision, this was probably the single most widely adopted approach to minimization. See, e.g.. United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976);
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); People v. Floyd, 41
N.Y.2d 245,251,360 N.E.2d 935, 941, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass.
224, 327 N.E.2d 819, 842 n.22 (1975); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974). See also United
States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
concept of assessing the monitors' good faith in evaluating compliance with the minimization provision.
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), discussed infra.
85. Several courts have upheld the practice of intercepting the first few minutes of every conversation,
to enable monitors to ascertain whether the conversation is likely to be, or to become, pertinent. See United
States v Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 757 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (two minutes), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978); United
States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909 n.1 (8th Cir.)(two to three minutes), cert denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977):
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 157 (9th Cir.)(one minute), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United
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monitor hears a discussion relating to criminal activity, or identifies the
conversants as participants in the crime under investigation, he continues to
listen to and record the conversation. If, on the other hand, the conversants
are not suspected of criminal involvement and the conversation appears to be
unrelated to such matters, the monitor deactivates both the listening and
recording devices.8 6 When the monitor is uncertain whether one or more
conversants are engaged in the criminal activity under investigation, he may
spot-monitor the conversation by periodically reactivating the listening and
recording devices until he can ascertain whether the conversants or subject
matter of the conversation have changed.8 7 If the conversation becomes
relevant to the investigation, or the conversants can be identified as targets of
the investigation, the monitor listens to and records the remainder of the
conversation; if not, he deactivates the equipment and continues to spotmonitor the conversation. The second variation on intrinsic minimization
involves listening to every conversation, but recording only pertinent conversations. 88 The Maryland Court of Appeals has endorsed this technique for use
in wiretaps.8 9 The Fourth Circuit has expressed concern regarding the
government's failure to record all conversations overheard in bugging
States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45 (3d Cir.)(one-and-one-half to two minutes), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858
(1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974)(two minutes), cert. denied. 420 U.S. 990
(1975); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 251, 360 N.E.2d 935, 941, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263 (1976)(thirty to
forty seconds). See also United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (2d Cir.)(interception of first five
minutes of each call accepted with reservations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
86. A number of courts have acknowledged that monitoring officers must be permitted a reasonable
amount of flexibility to guard against the possibility that "a conversation which appears innocent at first
may later turn to a discussion of criminal activity." United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975). To require the minimization of every conversation that is not obviously
and immediately relevant "would be an open invitation to criminals to escape detection by the simple
device of devoting the initial part of each call to non-criminal matters." United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d
751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd,436 U.S. 128 (1978). See also United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
87. Several courts have accepted spot-monitoring as evidence of a good-faith, reasonable effort to
minimize the interception of nonpertinent conversations. See United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002,
1011-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 390 (1978); United States v. Losing, 539 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1976); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245,
250-51, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940-41, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262-63 (1976). But see Post-Authorization Problems,
supra note 13, at 121-22 arguing that spot-monitoring might lend credence to defense claims that the tape
was altered or that the monitors failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976)(requiring all
intercepted conversations be recorded on tape).
88. This approach might be held to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1976), which requires that the
contents of intercepted communications "shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable
device. The recording. . . shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or other
alterations." See United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 718-19 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 390
(1978); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 634 n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(dictum), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976). But see United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 442 n.9 (8th Cir. 1976), which suggests that not only is
the recording of spot-checks not required but also that complete recording might violate the minimization
provision. The uncertainty is complicated by the absence of a precise definition of the statutory term
"intercept." See text accompanying notes 70-78 supra.
89. Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284, 289, 291-92 (1975).
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situations, although it did not find that this failure warranted reversal of
convictions.90
3. Dual recorder minimization
Dual recorder minimization utilizes two tape recorders. Monitors follow
intrinsic minimization by listening and recording on one tape recorder only
when they think a conversation is, or is about to become, pertinent. A second
recorder, the speaker of which is disconnected, records every conversation in
full. This second tape is never played back. Thus, the monitors hear only what
they are recording on the first recorder. 9 1
4. After-the-fact minimization
After-the-fact minimization involves recording every conversation and
then restricting disclosure of nonpertinent conversations by transcribing only
pertinent conversations, 92 or by re-recording only pertinent conversations and
then sealing the original tapes. 93
These methods of minimizing the interception of nonpertinent communications suggest the difficulties inherent in limiting eavesdropping efforts to
pertinent conversations. Even assuming a good faith effort to minimize,
inevitably, at least some interceptions will contain information irrelevant to
the crimes under investigation. The question remains whether the requirements of the minimization provision and the fourth amendment have been
violated if these procedures, or other good faith efforts at minimization, are
not utilized. In Scott v. United States,94 the Supreme Court addressed this
question.
90. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 390 (1978). In
Clerkley, the monitors listened to all conversations taking place in bugged premises whenever any of three
partners were present. They recorded only those conversations pertinent to gambling. Id. at 712. The
defendants argued that all conversations listened to should have been recorded. Id. at 718. The rationale for
recording all overheard conversations is to ensure that conversations introduced into evidence have not
been taken out of context. Id. at 719 n.8.
91. This procedure was followed by law enforcement officials in Nassau County, New York.
NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS, 235 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NWC
STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEYS]. The nonminimized, unmonitored tape "is kept for the sole purpose of

rebutting any charges that the police, in producing the minimized tape .... have cut out exculpatory
remarks" Id. The practice, however, may have a fringe benefit: if agents subsequently realize that they
mistakenly minimized an important conversation, they could apply for a search warrant to listen to that
conversation on the nonminimized tape. See Post-Authorization Problems, supra note 13, at 122 n.144.
92. See United States v. Bynum, 475 F.2d 832, 837, affid, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975). Subsequent to
the Bynum decisions, however, the Second Circuit has indicated a strong preference for a good-faith,
reasonable attempt to avoid listening to or recording nonpertinent conversations. See United States v.
Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Capra, 501
F.2d 267, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d
764, 783-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
93 See State v.Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 528-29, 291 A.2d 825, 830, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972). See
also People v.Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41, 47, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 1326, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (1977) (dictum).
94. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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III. Scott v. United States: JUDICIAL

INTERPRETATION OF THE
MINIMIZATION PROVISION

In Scott v. United States,95 the Supreme Court ruled that in some
circumstances monitoring officers can knowingly and willfully ignore the
minimization provision of Title III altogether. Scott involved successive

wiretaps on the home telephone of Geneva Jenkins with whom Bernis
Thurmon, a suspected participant in a narcotics importation and distribution

97
network, was then living. 96 Each warrant contained a minimization clause.

Every one of the 384 calls occurring during thirty days of monitoring was

overheard and recorded in full. 98 The defendants moved to suppress the
conversations and derivative evidence on the ground that the monitoring
agents had failed to minimize the interception of nonpertinent conversations.
The district court concluded that the agents had made no effort to minimize,
and granted the suppression motion. 99 On appeal, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the district court
had applied inappropriate standards for measuring minimization, and remanded for further proceedings. 100 After a four-day evidentiary hearing, the
district court again suppressed the conversations1 01 and was reversed again on
95. Id. Eight and a half years elapsed between the time that the tap was placed on the targeted
telephone and the Supreme Court decision. The case had a long and complicated journey through the
courts. The complete history of the case is as follows: 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971)(first suppression
motion granted), rev'd and remanded (for consideration in light of United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974)), 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974); in an unreported decision,
the suppression motion was once again granted, rev'd and remanded, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(four judges dissenting), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976)(three justices dissenting); Scott was found guilty in an unreported nonjury
trial, offd, 551 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 888 (1977), affd 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
96. Although the tap revealed only a local operation, rather than the anticipated extensive multistate
network, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. at 142 n.15, the investigation did result in the arrest of twenty-two
persons and the indictment of fourteen. Id. at 132.
97. "The order ...
required the agents to conduct the wiretap in 'such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications that are [not] otherwise subject to interception'...." Id. at 131-32. The
Court noted that "the word 'not' was inadvertently omitted, but the agents apparently understood the
intent of the order." Id. at 132 n.3.
98. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). The only
deviation from this policy occurred when agents accidentially tapped the wrong telephone. United States v.
Scott, 436 U.S. at 133 n.7. The issuing judge was not informed that every conversation was being
intercepted in full even though each warrant required periodic progress reports. United States v. Scott, 516
F.2d at 759-60.
99. The agents "'did not even attempt 'lip service compliance' with the provision of the order and
statutory mandate but rather completely disregarded it." United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 247
(D.D.C. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
100. United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Subsequent to the district court's initial
suppression order in Scott. the circuit court in United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974), held that the reasonableness of minimization must be evaluated in light of
specified circumstances: the scope of the criminal enterprise under investigation, the location and operation
of the subject telephone, the government's expectations of the contents of the calls, and the degree of
judicial supervision by the issuing judge. Id. at 1019-21. In Scott, 504 F.2d at 199, the circuit court directed
the district court to reevaluate the minimization issue in light of the standards enunciated in James.
101. At the hearing, the prosecutor offered a statistical "call analysis" that categorized 40% of the
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appeal. The appellate court concluded that "interception of all 384 conversations was not unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. .. ,"102 A
petition for rehearing en banc was denied with four judges dissenting,10 3 and
certiorari was denied with three justices dissenting. 0 4 Following a nonjury
trial on stipulated evidence, Scott and Thurmon were convicted of various
narcotics offenses.105
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered two separate issues: (1) whether
the government's failure to make any effort to minimize the interception of
nonpertinent conversations automatically rendered the interceptions unreasonable under the fourth amendment and violative of the minimization
provision of Title III; 106 and, (2) whether the total interception of each of the

384 calls, if not a per se violation, was "reasonable" under the particular

circumstances in Scott. 107

A. FAILURE TO ATTEMPT MINIMIZATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PER SE
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OR TITLE III

Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, rejected the defendants'
contention that failure to make good faith efforts to comply with the
minimization requirement was, in itself, violative of the fourth amendment or
Title 111.108 Adopting the government's viewpoint, the Court held that in
ruling on suppression motions, courts should make an objective evaluation of
monitoring agents' actions in light of the circumstances confronting them at
the time to determine whether a statutory or constitutional violation has
occurred. The Court observed that subjective intent alone does not transform
lawful conduct into an illegal or unconstitutional act. Subjective intent may be
relevant to the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment litigation only "after a statutory or constitutional violation has been
established." 1011
intercepted conversations as pertinent to the investigation, 37% as too ambiguous to be minimized, and
only 1.56%-six out of 384 calls-as conversations which should have been minimized. The district court
rejected this analysis as "an after-the-fact non-validated presentation .... " Quoted in United States v.
Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). The district judge again concluded
that although the monitoring agents "knew of the minimization requirement," they "made no attempt to
comply with the minimization order of the court but instead listened to and recorded all calls over the
[subject] phone. They showed no regard for the right to privacy and did nothing to avoid unnecessary
intrusion." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 144 (1978) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
102. 516 F.2d 751, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976). The court based its decision
on essentially the same factors as the Supreme Court. See note 148 & accompanying text infra.
103. 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Robinson, Bazelon, Wright & Leventhal, J.J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
104. 425 U.S. 917 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall & Powell, J.J., dissenting).
105. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 134 (1978).
106. Id. at 135-37.
107. Id. at 139-40.
108. Id. at 135.
109. Id. at 135-36. In other words, even if, viewed objectively, an officer violated a defendant's rights, it
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1. The Fourth Amendment and Failure to Attempt Minimization
In analyzing whether a failure to make any attempt to minimize violated
the Constitution, the Court reviewed prior fourth amendment decisions and
concluded that good faith was not a factor to be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of an officer's conduct."10 The Court thus adopted a "standard
of objective reasonableness" to be applied ex post facto.", In support of this
position, the Court relied upon United States v. Robinson,"12 Terry v. Ohio, 113
Beck v. Ohio," 4 and Henry v. United States."15 These cases do not directly
support the principle for which they are cited, much less justify the

application of that principle to electronic surveillance.
Each of the four cases involved a physical search not authorized by a
warrant. In each, the constitutionality of the search was contingent upon the
reasonableness of the prior warrantless stop or arrest. Because electronic
surveillance is conducted pursuant to a warrant, and involves a "search" of a
need not necessarily follow that the evidence thus seized must be suppressed for all purposes if the officer
was acting in good faith. In support of this principle the Court in Scott, 436 U.S. at 139 n.13, cited United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976), and United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1978). In
Janis, the Court held that where a state law enforcement officer, acting in good faith, seized evidence in
violation of Janis' constitutional rights, the suppression of such evidence in a criminal trial was sufficient to
satisfy the exclusionary rule. The evidence was admissible, however, in civil proceedings brought by the
Internal Revenue Service for the payment of wagering excise taxes. In Ceccolini, a police officer casually
but illegally perused the contents of an envelope, containing money and betting slips, that was lying on a
counter in defendant's store. An employee identified it as belonging to the defendant. This information was
transmitted to the F.B.I. which, some months later, contacted the employee who willingly provided
information about the defendant's activities. The Court held that defendant's motion to suppress the
witness' testimony should have been denied, noting that the illegal search had not been motivated by a
desire to identify witnesses who might testify against the defendant. Id. at 276 n.4.
110. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978).
111. Id. at 138. The Court conceded that its prior opinions had not addressed the question of whether
bad faith might render an otherwise reasonable search unlawful, but noted that "[t]he Courts of Appeals
which have considered the matter have . . . examin[ed] the challenged searches under a standard of
objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved." Id
(citing United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 854 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136
(1974)); Dodd v. Beto, 435 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971); Klingler v.
United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969); Green v. United States, 386
F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1967); and Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699, 702 (10th Cir.), cert. demed,
374 U.S. 807 (1963)). The Court acknowledged that in citing these cases it endorsed neither their language
nor holdings. Id. at 138 n.12. In Bugarin-Casas,the police lawfully stopped a car with the intention of
conducting an illegal search of it. After the stop, but prior to the search, the officers discovered additional
information that established probable cause to search the auto. The Ninth Circuit held the search to be
valid. 484 F.2d at 853.1n Klingler,a police officer arrested robbery suspects for vagrancy because he did not
think he had probable cause to arrest them for robbery. 409 F.2d at 304. Stressing that the record revealed
no bad faith, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the officer simply was mistaken in specifying the grounds
for arrest. Since probable cause to arrest for the robbery, viewed objectively, existed, the arrest was lawful.
Id. at 305. The evidence seized pursuant to the arrest, therefore, was not subject to suppression. 409 F.2d at
307.
112. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
113. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
114. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
115. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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nature and duration far greater than a physical search, the analogy to a
warrantless search is inherently flawed.1 6 Even if such an analogy were
appropriate, however, the elimination of good faith as a constitutional
requirement is not a logical extension of the precedents offered.
Beck and Henry involved searches incident to arrests for which no probable
cause was established. 1 7 In applying the exclusionary rule, the Court stated
that good faith is not enough to validate an otherwise unlawful search."18 This
language was echoed in Terry" 9 in which the defendant claimed that absent
probable cause to arrest, evidence seized in the course of a stop and frisk was
inadmissible in evidence. 20 The Court rejected this argument stating that a
two-step analysis is required to determine reasonableness.' 2 1 The first question to be asked is whether the officer's action is "justified at its inception"; 122
the second is whether the action is "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' 23 The
116. See notes 20-28, 61-62 & accompanying text supra: see also Scott, 436 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The objective judicial assessment of reasonableness for a warrantless search is made only after
the entire episode has taken place. When a search is made pursuant to a warrant, on the other hand, the
reasonableness of such action is assessed by a judge before the search occurs. Nevertheless, courts are still
required to assess the reasonableness of the manner in which the warrant was executed; and on this issue,
subjective good faith may be highly relevant. See note 134 & accompanying text infra.
117. The Court in Beck suppressed the fruits of a search incident to an arrest when the suppression
record did "not contain a single objective fact to support a belief by the officers that the petitioner was
engaged in criminal activity at the time they arrested him." 379 U.S. at 95. In Henry, two F.B.I. agents
investigating the theft of whiskey from interstate commerce, saw Henry and a companion twice pick up
cartons at a residence and load them into a car. Solely on this basis, the agents stopped the two men,
searched the car, and seized the cartons which contained stolen radios. 361 U.S. at 99-100. The Court
concluded that, viewed objectively, the suspects' activities did not give rise to probable cause. Id. at 104.
118. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 102, cited in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. at 97.
119. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). In Terry, a police officer observed three men apparently
casing a store. He stopped them to investigate and when they failed to identify themselves, frisked them for
weapons. Id. at 5-7. The Court held that when an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect is
armed and dangerous, he may conduct a limited search for weapons. Id. at 30.
120. Id. at 15.
121. Id. at 19-20.
122. Id. at 20. The Court concluded that the officer was justified in stopping Terry and his companions
to question them about behavior which, in the officer's experience, indicated that they were preparing to
commit a robbery. Id. at 22-23, 28. Recently, the Court reemphasized that the initial action must be
justified before subsequently discovered evidence is admissible. In Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391
(l79), the Court affirmed the suppression of marijuana seized following a random traffic stop. Citing
Scott, id. at 1396 n.9, the Court stated that the "reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum,
that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against 'an objective standard.' "
Id. at 1396 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say that where situations preclude "an insistence upon
some 'quantum of individualized suspicion,' other safeguards are generally relied upon" to ensure privacy
rights. Id. at 1396-97. The Court, again echoing the language of Terry, stated that there must be an
"articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the law is being violated to justify the initial intrusion. Id. at
1401 Because the officer in Prouse had no reason to stop the defendant's car, the evidence subsequently
seized was inadmissible. Id. at 1394. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)(per curiam)(ordering driver out of car after lawful stop for traffic violation justified as reasonable safety precaution; frisk of
suspicious bulge under defendant's jacket therefore reasonable and weapon found admissible in evidence).
123 302 U S. at 20. The Court concluded that the frisk was properly limited to a superficial pat-down
for %veapons.Id. at 29-30,
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officer's subjective belief is critical to such an inquiry because he "must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which. . . reasonably warrant
that intrusion." 24 It is these facts that are later subjected to the scrutiny of a
detached, neutral judge to determine whether or not the conduct also meets
the test of objective reasonableness.125 Simply stated, without either a warrant
or probable cause, the officer must have a good reason to justify a search.
The Terry standard of a limited search for weapons was urged upon the
Court in United States v. Robinson. 26 In Robinson, the defendant claimed that
his arrest for a traffic violation did not justify a search because neither of the
historical rationales-protection of the officer and preservation of evidence--for such a search was present. 127 Characterizing the search of the
person incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement as "unqualified,"' 128 the Court refused to carve out an exception
to the exception. 129 Almost as an afterthought, the Court dealt with the issue
of the arresting officer's subjective beliefs and declared that his lack of fear
was "of no moment."' 130 In so asserting, the Court left undisturbed the fourth
amendment principle that there must be a reasonable basis for the officer's
131
initial action that legitimizes his subsequent action.
To require a good faith effort to minimize simply means that the monitor
"must be able to point to specific and articulable facts"' 132 that justify
intercepting any conversation. The warrant satisfies this requirement for
conversations that are clearly related to the criminal activity under investigation; compelling reason~s must exist that justify the monitor's interception of
nonrelevant conversations-otherwise the interception should be regarded as
constitutionally unreasonable.
By eliminating good faith as a factor to be considered, the Court has
casually dispensed with the fundamental fourth amendment principle that the
33
reasonableness of a search cannot be measured by what in fact was seized.
The ex post facto analysis endorsed by the Court in Scott, then, completely
substitutes the judgment of the court for that of the monitoring agent instead
124. Id. at 21, quoted in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).

125. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21-22. In making this objective determination, the judge should
consider "the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience." Id. at 27. The officer's expertise introduces a subjective factor into an otherwise objective
determination. Further, courts frequently have relied upon police expertise in assessing whether probable
cause exists for an eavesdropping warrant. See FISHMAN, supra note 33, at § 73.
126. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
127. Id. at 233.
128. Id. at 230.

129. Id. at 235.
130. Id. at 236.

131. Id. at 235. No additional justification to search is required after a full-custody arrest. Id. See notes
121-23 & accompanying text supro.
132. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
133. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471.
484 (1963).
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of serving as a check on the agent's discretion. With knowledge of all the
circumstances ultimately discovered by monitors in the course of a lengthy
surveillance, courts are invited to apply what best can be described as twentytwenty hindsight in making an "objective" determination of whether the
monitors' conduct was reasonable.
Finally, in assessing the constitutionality of the failure to minimize, the
Court completely ignored the distinction between an isolated physical search
and seizure and a continuing series of surreptitious interceptions. A considerable body of case law has developed under the fourth amendment that
strictly circumscribes the circumstances under which, and the the procedures
by which, a physical search can be conducted. 3 4 This is true even though a
physical search is of limited duration and usually is conducted with the
knowledge of the suspect. A prolonged investigation utilizing electronic
surveillance presents increased opportunities for abuse; those utilizing the

telephones or premises under surveillance can neither observe nor complain
about the conduct of the police during the course of the search because they

are unaware of it. Such factors would seem to dictate more rigorous
procedures to meet constitutional requirements. After Scott, however, police
officers are left with little guidance as to what a court will later deem

"reasonable" and with no effective deterrent to a practice of gathering as
much information as possible whether pertinent or not.135 Ultimately, this
advances neither the interests of law enforcement nor the rights of citizens.
134. When police officers execute a standard search warrant, e.g., they are usually forbidden to forcibly
enter the premises to be searched unless, after stating their authority and purpose, they encounter
resistance or hear sounds that indicate that the sought-after evidence is being destroyed. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109 (1976). If, without these grounds, the police break down the door and come upon a suspect who
might have destroyed the evidence had the officers knocked and announced, the post hoc assessment of
objective reasonableness might indicate that the officers were correct in failing to knock; their blatant
disregard of the law, however, renders the search and seizure, which had been found objectively reasonable
in advance by the judge who issued the warrant, unlawful. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963).
For a discussion of this proposition, see id. at 40 n.12 (Clark, J., writing for a four-justiceplurality).See also
id. at 53-60 (Brennan, J., with whom Warren, C.J., & Douglas & Goldberg J.J. concurred, dissenting);
United States v. Likas, 478 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1971); State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822
(1971).
135. If the suppression of nonrelevant conversations only is the standard applied by the court, aggrieved
persons are left with only civil remedies. See note 24 & accompanying text supra and notes 211-213 &
accompanying text infra. The same approach as that discussed in note 134 supra, should govern where
officers executing an eavesdropping warrant blatantly disregard the minimization provisions of the statute
and the warrant. Assume, for example, that at 7:00 p.m. each evening the suspected leader of a narcotics
conspiracy telephones his mother and talks with her about personal matters that are totally unrelated to the
investigation. After several days, a pattern of nonpertinence should be apparent to the monitors. See text
accompanying notes 158-59 infra. Absent exigent circumstances, such calls are no longer subject to
interception. See note 168 & accompanying text infra. Nevertheless, the officers continue to monitor. The
interception of the 7:00 p.m. call, finally producing vital evidence on the thirtieth day of the tap,
undoubtedly would be deemed unreasonable by a standard of objective reasonableness. It is less certain
whether interception of an incriminating 7:00 p.m. call on the seventh, eighth, or ninth day would be so
regarded; such interceptions are neither clearly reasonable nor clearly unreasonable. An ex post facto
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2. Title III and Failure to Attempt Minimization
Having rejected subjective good faith as a relevant consideration in
eavesdropping interceptions under the fourth amendment, the Court likewise
rejected the argument that the minimization provision of Title III requires
agents to make a subjective good faith effort to minimize. The Court
concluded that Congress did not intend such a result:
[I]n the very section in which it directs minimization Congress, by
its use of the word "conducted," made it clear that the focus was to
be on the agents' actions not their motives. Any lingering doubt is
dispelled by the legislative history which . . . declares that [18
U.S.C. § 2515, the statutory exclusionary rule] was not intended
''generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present
136
search and seizure law."'
This interpretation of the minimization provision misconstrues congressional intent. 37 Title III requires law enforcement officials and judges to
make subjective assessments throughout the eavesdropping process. The law
enforcement official who authorizes the submission of an eavesdropping
application to a judge must first make a subjective decision whether the level
of criminality under investigation merits the use of eavesdropping. 38 The
judge to whom the application is submitted is empowered to make the same
subjective assessment. 139 Once a warrant has been issued, moreover, the
issuing judge is authorized to supervise the manner in which the warrant is
executed and to make periodic, and necessarily subjective, assessments to
determine whether interceptions should be allowed to continue. 40 If evidence
assessment of these calls, using a purely "objective" test, may well be influenced by what, in fact, was
intercepted. A good-faith effort to minimize, then, would supply an additional-and essential-standard
by which reasonableness can be determined. If an overall effort to minimize had been made, it would be
appropriate for the judge to accept the monitors' decision to intercept these calls.
136. 436 U.S. at 138-39 (citing S. REP. No. 1097 supra note 4, at 96, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE
CQNG. & AD. NEWS at 2185).

137. The Court places more emphasis on Congress's selection of the word "conducted" than it merits.
The verb conduct focuses neither on actions nor motives.
138. See note 38 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra. The warrant may be rendered invalid if information
necessary for such judicial assessment is wrongfully withheld. See United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Objection may be raised to describing judicial assessments as "subjective" rather than
"objective," since the role of the judge in fourth amendment litigation is to assess the justification for a
search and seizure "against an objective standard" of reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968). All such judicial assessments are by definition "objective" in that they are made by "a neutral and
detached magistrate" rather than by "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
111 (1964). In deciding whether to issue an eavesdropping warrant, however, the judge is called upon to
evaluate, not only whether as a matter of law there is sufficient probable cause to justify the intrusion, but
whether as a matter of policy the level of criminality to be uncovered is serious enough to make the
intrusion worthwhile. Such a decision is "subjective" in the sense that it is made by an individual judge who
is unable to refer to prior case law or to confer with any collective, "objective" consciousness. The judge'
personal judgment is simply a check on the authorizing official's personal judgment.
140. See text accompanying notes 45 supra & 186-93 infra.
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of crimes other than those specified in the warrant is obtained, such evidence
may be disclosed in a grand jury or court proceeding only if, prior to such
disclosure, an appropriate judge concludes, inter alia, that the original
warrant "was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search, and that
[conversations involving other crimes were,] in fact, incidentally intercepted
during the course of a lawfully executed order."' 141 Thus, the statute requires
subjective judicial evaluation of the judgment and good-faith conduct of law
enforcement officials before the warrant issues and after it has been executed.
It constitutes a substantial misreading of the spirit and the letter of Title III to
conclude that judicial evaluation of the manner in which the monitors
"conducted" interceptions is to be made solely from an "objective" assessment of what was intercepted. 142
The Court's elimination of good faith from the Title III minimization
provision is ironic in light of congressional treatment of minimization in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,143 which regulates the use of
electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information within the
United States. This statute contains a minimization provision' 44 which is
"meant generally to parallel the minimization provision in [Title III]." 145 The
141. S.REP. No. 1097, supra note 4 at 100, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEWS 2112,
2189 (commenting on 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5))(emphasis added). Neither Title III nor the Senate report
contain a specific definition of the phrase "lawfully executed." Clearly, however, execution of a warrant, to
be lawful, must be conducted in compliance with the provisions of the warrant and in compliance with the
provisions of Title III. Title III has only one provision which directly discusses how a warrant is to be
executed. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) requires that each warrant contain a provision that the warrant be executed
as soon as is practicable, that interceptions cease "upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any
event in thirty days," and that each warrant contain a minimization provision. Since the minimization
directive is an integral part of the one section of the statute which speaks to the execution of eavesdropping
warrants, minimization must be an integral aspect of "lawful execution."
142. An analogy to principles of administrative law may be helpful. Given the nature of eavesdropping
and the duration of the search it authorizes, agents monitoring a wiretap or bugging warrant necessarily
exercise judgment and discretion far beyond that normally permitted of law enforcement officials in
searches and seizures. See notes 20-28 & accompanying text supra. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S.Ct.
1391 (1979), holding that it is constitutionally impermissible for the "agent in the field" to have'
unregulated discretion to stop an automobile for a random license and registration check. Where broad
discretion is given to a regulatory agency, the actions of the agency are subject to judicial review based on
one or more of several theories. One approach is to assess whether the official action was objectively
reasonable. Courts, however, frequently go beyond that assessment and consider whether agency action
was arbitrary and capricious or constituted an abuse of discretion. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551, 706 (1976). By analogy, if monitors fail to exercise any discretion in deciding which
conversations to intercept, their bad-faith disregard of the statutory and warrant minimization mandate
constitutes an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.
143 PUn. L. No. 95-511, Title I, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801).
144. The statute requires the establishment of procedures "that are reasonably designed . . . to
minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit [except in specified circumstances] the dissemination,
of nonpublicly available information concerning nonconsenting United States persons" that does not relate
to foreign intelligence matters. 50 U.S.C A. § 1801(h)(2) (West Supp. 1979). United States persons are
defined as citizens, resident aliens, and domestic organizations and corporations. Id. at § 1801(i).
145 S.REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (Judiciary Committee), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 3938; S.REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (Intelligence Committee), reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048.
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Senate committees that participated in drafting the 1978 statute cited with
approval pre-Scott Title III case law to emphasize that good faith is
required. 146 It thus appears reasonable to hope that Congress will consider
legislation to reverse Scott by incorporating good faith as an explicit
requirement of Title III's minimization provision. The remainder of this
article seeks to demonstrate the logic of and need for such corrective
legislation.
B. FACTORS AFFECTING MINIMIZATION: WHAT CONSTITUTES
REASONABLENESS UNDER TITLE III

After deciding that the failure to attempt to minimize interceptions is
neither inherently unreasonable under the fourth amendment, nor a violation
of Title III, the Court considered whether the monitoring agents in Scott had
acted reasonably under the circumstances. Prefatory to its "objective"
assessment of whether the full interception of all 384 calls was "reasonable,"
the Court observed:
[B]ecause of the necessarily ad hoc nature of any determination of
reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law which will
decide every case. The statute does not forbid the interception of all
nonrelevant conversations, but rather instructs the agents to
conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to "minimize" the
interception of such conversations. Whether the agents have in fact
conducted the wiretap in such a manner will depend on the facts
147
and circumstances in each case.
The Court ultimately upheld the circuit court's conclusion that total
interception of every conversation was reasonable under the particular
circumstances presented in Scott. This finding was based on several factors
which, the Court held, affect a monitor's ability to minimize: the type of use
to which the targeted telephone was normally put, the government's goals and
expectations, the scope of criminal activity revealed by the eavesdropping, the
degree to which patterns of nonpertinent conversations could be discerned,
the use of ambiguous, guarded or coded language, and the brevity of some
146. Both of the Senate committee reports cited in note 145 supra, were ordered printed before the Scott
decision and contain the following passage:
In assessing the minimization effort, the court's role is to determine whether "on the whole,
the agents have shown a high regard for the right to privacy and have done all they reasonably
could to avoid unnecessary intrusion." Absent a charge that the minimization procedures
have been disregarded completely, the test of compliance is "whether a good faith effort to
minimize was attempted."
S. REP. No. 604, supra note 145, at 37, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3938; . REP.
No. 701, supra note 145, at 39, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 4008-09 (citing United
States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) and United States v.
Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir. 1975)).
147. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978).
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conversations. 148 These and other factors that affect an agent's ability to
minimize had been the subject of extensive commentary prior to Scott.
49
Because of the brevity with which the Court discussed these factors, it is

worthwhile to examine how these factors have been treated by other courts in
determining whether a monitoring agent's failure to minimize was reasonable. 150

1. Factors Affecting Minimization
Courts have identified a number of factors that affect the ability of

monitoring agents to minimize the interception of nonpertinent conversations. When several of these factors are present, courts have tended to take a
lenient attitude toward practices that otherwise might be viewed as a failure to

minimize.
a. Nature and Use of Telephone or Premises

The manner in which the targeted telephone or premises normally is used
clearly affects the degree to which interception of nonpertinent conversations
151
can and should be minimized.

b. Goals of the Investigation;Scope of CriminalActivity
A key factor affecting the propriety of extensive monitoring is the purpose
for which the eavesdropping warrant was obtained. For example, when a
widespread conspiracy is suspected, courts have permitted extensive surveil'
lance in an attempt to determine the "precise scope of the enterprise,"'

52

148. Id. at 140-42.
149. See text accompanying notes 194-97 infra.
150. One of the difficulties in evaluating minimization case law is the courts' tendency to cite similar
concepts and to use identical language in cases with substantially different facts. As compliance with the
minimization provision "will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case," Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. at 140, it is difficult to evaluate the cases cited herein without a summary of the facts and
circumstances presented in each case. To assist the reader, a brief factual summary of several important
minimization cases is provided as an appendix to this article.
151. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). Accord, United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007,
1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 100, 338 A.2d 284, 291
(1975); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224 n.21, 327 N.E.2d 819, 842 n.21 (1975). Interception in
full of every conversation on residential telephones was approved in Scott and James. It was also approved
in United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974)
affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); and United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975),
all of which involved fairly extensive narcotics operations. Total interception, however, is excessive if the
narcotics activity is limited in scope. United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 538-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); People v. Brenes, 42
NY.2d 41, 364 N.E2d 1322, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1977).
152. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). The Court in Scott observed that although "the
conspiracy turned out to involve mainly local distribution, rather than major interstate and international
importation. . . . there is little doubt on the record that, as the agents originally thought, the conspiracy
can fairly be characterized as extensive." Id. at 142 n.15. Twenty-two persons were arrested, and fourteen
indicted, as a result of the investigation. Id. at 132.
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particularly with regard to conversations involving at least one suspected
member of the conspiracy. 153 Courts have been permissive regarding investigations of complex narcotics conspiracies, frequently finding acceptable
the interception of every conversation for the duration of the investigation.
Wide latitude is given to police because the intricacies of these conspiracies
make them unusually difficult to monitor. 154
Permissive minimization standards, however, are not unique to narcotics
conspiracy cases. The goals of an investigation and the scope of criminal
activity have been cited as justifying extensive interception in cases involving
other crimes.

55

c. Expectations at the Outset of Monitoring
Several courts have suggested that investigators' reasonable expectations at
the outset of an investigation are particularly relevant in evaluating the
manner in which an eavesdropping warrant has been executed. For example,
if at the outset of the investigation police are aware of the identities of the
suspects and know the hours during which the telephone or premises will be
153. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
154. Id. at 140. Accord, United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir.) ("even calls involving
doctors, real estate agents, telephone employees, and other apparently legitimate business or personal calls
could not be above suspicion"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007,
1019 (D.C. Cir.) ("some sophisticated narcotics conspiracies closely resemble advanced commercial
enterprises with production and distribution networks, collection personnel, internal security forces, and so
forth"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 599 (2d Cir. 1973) ("a
narcotics conspiracy . . . is one of the most difficult things to surveil and obtain evidence on . . . in

modem law enforcement"), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
James, Manfredi, Chavez and all but one of the cases cited in Chavez, as well as Scott, uphold the
interception in full of every conversation for the duration of the wiretaps. Perhaps the most extreme
example is United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500-02 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417
U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975), where the total
interception of more than 2,000 phone calls, including 73 lengthy "conversations of Bynum's infant
daughter's babysitter, Donna, with her friends and classmates, which were clearly innocent," was held not
to constitute a failure to minimize. 485 F.2d at 502.
Other courts have cited the goals and scope of a narcotics investigation as justifying extensive
monitoring in cases where substantial minimization was nevertheless achieved. See, e.g., United States v.
Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245,
251-52, 360 N.E.2d 935, 941, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263 (1976); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 101, 338 A.2d
284, 291 (1975) (minimization achieved by listening to every conversation while recording only pertinent
conversations). But see, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523, 538-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973) and People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d
41, 48, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-27, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 634 (1977), both of which involved narcotics
investigations of limited scope. In both cases, total interception of all conversations was condemned as
excessive.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 1977) (gambling) cert. denied, 436
U.S. 390 (1978); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 441 (8th Cir. 1976) (mail fraud); Commonwealth v.
Vitello, 367 Mass. 224 n.21, 327 N.E.2d 819, 842 n.21 (1975) (gambling); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 536-40,
291 A.2d 825, 834-36 (organized crime-bookmaking), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972). Some
conversations were minimized in Clerkley and Daly; in Dye, the court endorsed a combined extrinsic and
after-the-fact approach to minimization; Vitello does not specify whether conversations were in fact
minimized.
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used to discuss the crimes under investigation, they should tailor their
monitoring practices to avoid intercepting conversations of other individuals
156
and conversations that occur at other times.
On the other hand, a much more inclusive approach has been permitted
when law enforcement officials expect to uncover evidence of a complex
conspiracy, the extent and membership of which are unknown. Several courts
have found it reasonable to intercept all calls at the initial stages of
157
surveillance so that categories of irrelevant calls can be established.
d. Patternsand Categoriesof Conversations
Courts frequently have observed that monitoring agents should attempt to
discern patterns of nonpertinent conversations, because it is unreasonable to
continue intercepting conversations that are clearly and identifiably innocent. 158 This is particularly important where agents have intercepted every
call in full at the outset of the investigation. 159 Unfortunately, this practice of
initial, total interception often has led to the interception in full of every
conversation for the duration of the investigation.160 All-inclusive interception
is difficult to distinguish from the general eavesdropping warrant condemned
156. United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974), quoted
in United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434,441 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29,44 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874 (7th Cir. 1975). See
also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 141 (1978). In all but Daly, however, this viewpoint is only
dictum. In James, Scott, Armocida and Quintana, each of which involved narcotics conspiracies of some
complexity, every conversation was intercepted in full throughout the duration of the wiretap.
157. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 142 (1978). See also United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491,
493-94 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976), where the court observed:
In the early stage of the use of the [wire]tap, it may be necessary to listen to all or substantially
all conversations in order to find out how extensive the conspiracy is, who the conspirators
are, where and when they meet, how they do business, and the other important and often
complex details that make up the conspiracy.
See also United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d
490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds,417 U.S. 903 (1974), off d, 513 F.2d 533, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 952 (1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020
(1974).
158. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 141 (1978). See text accompanying note 157 supra. See also
United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978); United States
v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 441 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156-57 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Bynum,
485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975). In Scott, Abascal, Quintana,James, and Bynum, every conversation
was intercepted in full for the duration of the eavesdropping.
159. See note 157 supra.
160. Every conversation was intercepted in full throughout the duration of the wiretapping in James
(forty days), Bynum (five weeks on one phone, three weeks on a second phone), Scott (thirty days),
Quintana (twenty days), Abascal (twelve days), and Chavez (nine and one-half days) without reproach.
Occasionally, the failure to perceive a pattern of innocence can only be described as extraordinarily
myopic. See discussion of "babysitter Donna's" conversations in Bynum, note 154 supra. Cf. United States
v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (discussion of "King-Phyllis" conversation), rev'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973).
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in Berger v. New York, 16 1 and may effectively nullify the minimization
requirement. 162
Patterns of innocent conversations may emerge with respect to persons,
telephone numbers, and time periods. Several courts have suggested that
monitors should attempt to ascertain who among those using the telephone or
premises being monitored actually are engaged in the criminal activity under
investigation. When no participants to a conversation are suspected of
involvement, continued interception of such conversations is unreasonable. 163
When, however, monitors have identified one participant to a conversation as

a suspect and are uncertain whether another participant is also involved in
criminality, the agents may have to gather additional information before they
can determine whether further conversations between the same individuals
are to be minimized. 164 Furthermore, complications may arise when a suspect

has not been positively identified. For example, an otherwise irrelevant
conversation between a suspect and nonsuspect may reveal the suspect's age,

address, occupation, family ties, or other information that would enable
165
investigators to confirm the suspect's identity.

161. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra. It is interesting to note that
although the statute and warrant in Berger authorized unrestricted interception for up to 60 days,
interception was in fact terminated after 13 days. Id. at 100 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
162. In the author's view spot-monitoring, described in the text accompanying notes 85-87 supra, is a
better approach than initial, total interception. See text accompanying note 243 infra.
163. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). Although
Scott and most other cases cited herein involved the use of wiretaps, the principles discussed in these cases
generally should apply to bugging devices as well.
164. Id. In Scott, the Supreme Court observed, "Some of the nonpertinent conversations were one-time
conversations. Since these calls did not give the agents an opportunity to develop a category of innocent
calls which should not have been intercepted, their interception cannot be viewed as a violation of the
minimization requirement." 436 U.S. at 142. Although the Court did not define "one-time conversation,"
the phrase apparently refers to a telephone call in which at least one participant was intercepted over the
tapped phone only once during the investigation. See also People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 252, 360 N.E.2d
935, 938, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263-64 (1976). But see Minimization of Wire Interceptions,supra note 78, at
1422.
The difficulties that sometimes arise in classifying a particular category of calls as pertinent or
nonpertinent are illustrated by seven calls between Geneva Jenkins and her mother in Scott. The first four
calls, occurring during the first three days of the tap, were relatively brief and "at least two of them
indicated that the mother may have known of the conspiracy." 436 U.S. at 142. A week later two more calls
were intercepted, during which the mother said she wanted to tell Jenkins something about the "business"
but did not want to do so over the phone. The seventh call was "substantially longer and likewise contained
a statement which could have been interpreted as having some bearing on the conspiracy." Id. Although
none of these conversations turned out to be significant in the investigation or trial, the Court concluded
that "the agents did not act unreasonably at the time they made these interceptions." Id.
165. Several courts have cited the need to identify co-conspirators as justifying more extensive
interception. See, e.g., United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977) (narcotics), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 716-17 (4th Cir. 1977) (bookmaking), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 390 (1978); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434,441 (8th Cir. 1976) (mail fraud) and cases
cited therein; United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.)(narcotics), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858
(1975). See also Zuckerman & Lyons, Strategyand Tactics in the Prosecutionand Defense of Complex WireInterception Cases, NWC COMMISSION STUDIEs 25, 43-45 (1976). But see Minimization of Wire
Interceptions, supra note 78 at 1418-19, criticizing this approach as excessively permissive.
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It may be fairly simple to categorize calls to a particular telephone number
as not pertinent to the investigation. If several outgoing calls are made to a
telephone that is neither registered to nor utilized by a suspect, and there is no
indication that important information will be gleaned from further interception of conversations to that telephone, monitors should cease intercepting
such conversations. 166 Similarly, if it becomes obvious that conversations that
occur before or after a certain hour are never pertinent, monitors should
167
minimize interception of such conversations.
Once a particular category of conversation has been classified as "innocent," its continued interception generally is improper, although flexibility
should be allowed in unusual circumstances. 168 On the other hand, once a
category of conversation has been classified as pertinent, courts have held that
subsequent conversations in this category may be intercepted in their entirety.
Although some conversations between suspected conspirators may pertain to
wholly innocent and unrelated topics, it is impossible for monitors to know
169
that such conversations are not pertinent until they have been completed.
e. Coded, Guarded or Cryptic Language
If those under investigation attempt to conceal their identities and disguise
their conversations, the task of distinguishing pertinent from nonpertinent
communications is more difficult. Several courts have held that when those
under investigation utilize such tactics, monitors are justified in listening
more extensively. 70 In Scott, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the use of
166. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1048-49 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), affd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). Unfortunately, courts have
occasionally excused the continued interception of exclusively personal and nonpertinent calls long after it
should have been apparent that nothing relevant would be overheard. See, for example, the discussion of
"babysitter Donna's" conversations in Bynum, note 154, supra.
167. See People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 247, 360 N.E.2d 935, 938, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 260 (1976)
(although warrants authorized surveillance for total of 2,880 hours, monitoring conducted only 1,210
hours).
168. For example, assume that the main suspect in a narcotics investigation telephones his mother
every evening at 7 p.m. and discusses only personal matters with her. Once this pattern is discerned, the
monitors should cease intercepting such calls. If, however, at 6:45 p.m. one evening a call is intercepted
which reveals that a major narcotics transaction (or other serious crime) is planned for the immediate
future, it would seem reasonable to intercept the suspect's 7 p.m. call to his mother because he may reveal
where he will be going or with whom he will be meeting later in the evening.
169. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). Accord,
United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 416 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975); United
States v King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 542, affd in part and rev'd in part, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 920 (1973); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 252, 360 N.E.2d 935, 942, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263-64
(1976). But see Post-Authorization Problems, supra note 13, at 107 n.74.
170. A number of opinions have so held with regard to narcotics wiretaps. See United States v. Capra,
501 F.2d 267, 273-76 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d
872, 878-80 & nn.5, 6 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974), cited in United States v. Turner,
528 F.2d 143, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975). See also United States v. James, 494
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codes and other ambiguities may render interpretation and categorization of
many conversations virtually impossible until after the conversation is
completed.171
2. Bugging Devices
The task of defining minimization standards and practices is even more
complex for bugging devices than it is for wiretaps. Face-to-face conversations cannot be divided into "discrete units" or "assessed on an individual
basis."172 Unless voice-activated tape recorders are utilized, there may be no
way of knowing when a conversation is taking place. 173 If visual surveillance
of the bugged premises is impracticable, monitors may be unable to establish,
aside from the listening device, whether the premises is unoccupied, occupied
by only one individual, or by several. In addition, conversants may discuss
diverse matters, swiftly and unexpectedly moving from one topic to another. 174 Case law and commentary addressing these problems have been scanty.
The same factors that affect minimization of wiretaps are relevant to bugs.
The nature and use of the premises may be the single most important
consideration. If the bugged premises is primarily a residence, the practice of
initially intercepting all conversations should be avoided because the percentage of nonpertinent, private and privileged discussions is likely to be
extremely high. Monitoring of a residence should be restricted to situations
175
most likely to produce pertinent conversations.
F.2d 1007, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1048
(D. Md. 1972), affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), cited in United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975).
Accord, Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 102, 338 A.2d 284, 292 (1975); People v. Floyd, 360 N.E.2d 935, 942,
392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263-64 (1976). But see People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41, 44, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 1326, 396
N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (1977). The use of coded or cryptic language and correspondingly relaxed minimization
standards, also has been noted with regard to other crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434,
441 (8th Cir. 1976) (mail fraud); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 783 (2d Cir. 1973) (stolen
property and forged instruments), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1974). The use of cryptic codes was depicted
in a Broadway musical in which a bookmaker used composers' names to identify racetracks. Comden,
Greene & Styne, It's a Simple Little System, BELLS ARE RINGING (1956).
171. 436 U.S. at 142-43.
172. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978).
173. Such recorders might also be activated if a radio or television is turned on in the room being
bugged.
174. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978). For
example, two persons may be having an extended conversation about a completely innocent topic. A third
person, listening to, but not joining in the discussion, and whose presence therefore may be unknown to the
monitors, might briefly interrupt to issue conspiracy-related instructions to the others.
175. For example, if events that relate to the crime under investigation occur outside the home,
extensive monitoring of the premises might be justified for a few hours or days in the reasonable
expectation that the occupants will discuss those events. When nonmembers of the household are present,
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If the bugged premises is a business location, greater initial leeway should
be permitted. In United States v. Clerkley, 176 a complex gambling investigation, the Fourth Circuit upheld the practice of listening whenever at least one
identified suspect was present. 77 Given the difficult circumstances of the
178
investigation, the court held that continuous interception was justifiable.

Finally, if the premises is utilized solely for criminal activity, or is a social
club the membership of which is restricted to those engaged in crime, the
presumption might be in favor of full interception until patterns of nonpertinent conversations emerge.
3. Intrinsic Minimization Not Practicable
The intrinsic approach to minimization has emerged as the preferred
procedure in most jurisdictions. 179 In some situations, however, intrinsic
minimization may not be practicable. For example, if the targets of a wiretap
or bug occasionally converse in a foreign language, it is permissible to
intercept such conversations in full and have the conversations translated
later. 180 If, however, substantial portions of the conversations are in a foreign
language and officers fluent in that language are available, such officers
should conduct the monitoring and should intrinsically minimize nonper-

tinent conversations.'81
Occasionally, intrinsic minimization is impossible because of geography. If
detection of monitoring officers is likely because of the physical peculiarities
of the location of the targeted premises, use of an automatically triggered,

continuously operating tape recorder may be justified.182
it is less likely that privileged or private matters will be discussed, so moderately extensive monitoring
might be reasonable until it can be ascertained whether such persons are involved in criminal activity.
Absent unusual circumstances, however, agents should be restricted to random spot-monitoring when only
household members are present. Should it develop that crime-related conversations occur frequently even
when only family members are present, monitors would be justified in increasing the extent to which
conversations among family members are overheard and recorded. In such a situation, the best solution is
to adopt the after-the-fact approach to minimization. See notes 92-93 & accompanying text supra.
176. 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978).
177. Id. at 716-17.
178. Id. at 717. Although the monitors listened to all such conversations, they recorded only those that
were judged to be pertinent. The court concluded that this practice violated 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a), which
requires that all intercepted conversations be recorded, but held that this violation did not require the
suppression of evidence. Id. at 718-19.
179. With the exception of State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 522-25, 291 A.2d 825, 827-28, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1090 (1972), virtually all of the cases cited in notes 84 supra, through 180 infra, have explicitly or
implicitly adopted the intrinsic approach.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976);
United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975); People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41, 47, 364
N.E.2d 1322, 1326, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (1977)(dictum).
181. People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41, 48, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 1330, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 634 (1977)(that
target of wiretap in New York City spoke Spanish did not justify failure to attempt to achieve
contemporaneous minimization).
182. People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 41, 47, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 1326, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (1977)(dic-
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An even thornier problem is presented where a defendant is preparing for
or is on trial and the authorities have probable cause to believe that the
defendant and his attorney are conspiring to bribe or threaten jurors or
witnesses. 183 It might be impossible to minimize interception of privileged

communications concerning legitimate trial tactics and strategy while seeking
to overhear conversations relating to efforts to tamper with jurors or
witnesses. A possible solution might be to segregate officials involved in the
prosecution from those who investigate the new offense when issuing the
warrant. The judge could include a provision prohibiting investigators from
disclosing any information obtained unless expressly authorized to do so by
184

the court.
Because alternatives to intrinsic minimization increase the risk of intrusion
upon the privacy of innocent persons and nonincriminating conversations,
such alternatives should be utilized only with the express approval of the
issuing judge. The warrant should restrict access to the nonminimized
recordings to one or two officers whose duty it would be to listen to the tapes.
They should rerecord only the conversations thought to be pertinent, and
then seal the original tapes. The warrant also should prohibit these officers
from disclosing the contents of nonrerecorded conversations unless expressly
authorized to do so by the court. 85
turn). Other situations might arise which have not yet been addressed in reported opinions. An
eavesdropping warrant might be issued in a rural area where the law enforcement agency lacks sufficient
manpower to conduct live monitoring.
183. Intrusions into attorney-client conversations could taint a concurrent trial and require dismissal of
the indictment. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 308 (1966) (dictum)(citing Caldwell v. United States,
205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953)).
184. Although there appear to be no reported cases endorsing this procedure, an analogy may be drawn
to cases in which a defendant alleges that a prior, illegal wiretap has tainted a subsequent wiretap or trial.
See United States v. Sapere, 531 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 913 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); United States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163, 171 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); Baker v. United States, 430 F.2d 499, 502-03 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970). See also United States v. Magaddino, 496 F.2d 455, 458-61 (2d Cir. 1974).
In Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld a similar procedure in a
noneavesdropping context. Bursey and two others, accompanied by Weatherford, an undercover police
agent, vandalized a Selective Service office. In order not to jeopardize Weatherford's undercover status in
other investigations, Weatherford was arrested and charged along with Bursey. On two occasions prior to
Bursey's trial, Weatherford, at Bursey's request, participated in pretrial conferences with Bursey and
Bursey's attorney. At the time, the prosecution had not intended to call Weatherford as a witness, and
Weatherford did not communicate anything he had heard at these meetings to his superiors or to the
prosecutor. At trial, the prosecutor decided to call Weatherford as a witness; his testimony was restricted
to the break-in and events which had preceded it. Bursey was convicted, disappeared, was apprehended two
years later, and served an eighteen-month sentence. Thereafter, he brought a civil action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that by attending the conferences between Bursey and his attorney, Weatherford
had violated Bursey's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and his fourteenth
amendment due process right to a fair trial. The district court entered judgment for Weatherford; the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 528 F.2d 483 (1975). On certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that if, as found by the district court, Weatherford had
communicated nothing about the two meetings to anyone else, Bursey's sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights were not violated. 429 U.S. at 557-58.
185. A variation on this procedure was adopted in State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 519-21 291 A.2d 825,
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4. Judicial Supervision
Title III authorizes the issuing judge to require that periodic reports be
submitted to him concerning the progress of the investigation.186 Congress
intended the progress report provision to provide a judicial "check on the
continuing need to conduct surveillance." A judge may terminate the warrant
whenever he is convinced that there is no longer a need for continued
surveillance. 187 A second reason for requiring such reports is to detect and
remedy any possible minimization abuses. 188 A number of courts have
suggested that the issuing judge's supervision and reception of periodic
reports concerning execution of the warrant constitutes substantial evidence
that the monitoring procedures utilized were reasonable. 89
Unfortunately, "the protections to be enforced by the judiciary are often
illusory."190 Because the issuing judge has discretion whether to require
progress reports, trial and appellate courts have refused to evaluate the
adequacy of such reports, 19! and have declined to impose sanctions when
reports are submitted late or are not submitted at all.1 92 Moreover, some
appellate courts have relied upon the issuing judge's supervision of monitoring to uphold the total interception of all conversations even though the judge
was unaware that this practice was being followed. In such situations, judicial
"supervision" may constitute little more than uninformed judicial ratification
of improper conduct. 93
827-28, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972), and the procedure has been suggested in dictum in United
States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500-02 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on othergrounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), aff'd,
513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1976). Most state eavesdropping statutes contain a similar provision; absence
of such a provision, however, does not render a state statute invalid. Lawson v. State, 236 Ga. 770, 772, 225
S.E.2d 258, 260; cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
187. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 104, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112,
2193.
188. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154 (1974). See note 222 infra. Investigators have discovered
a third reason for submitting such reports. "[J]udicial oversight, when based upon progress reports, can in
effect act as a ratification of the officers' conduct, thereby making suppression more unlikely." NWC
REPORT, supra note 5, at 96.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977);
United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978); United
States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v.
Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975) and cases cited therein; United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007,
1021-22 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 100, 338 A.2d 284,
291 (1975); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 253, 360 N.E.2d 935, 942, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 264
(1976)(dictum).
190. H. SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 23 (1977).
191. See, eg., United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641-42 (2d Cir. 1977); cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903
(1978); United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other groundssub nom.
Cabral v. United States, 430 U.S. 902 (1977); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 853 (3d Cir. 1976).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Canon, 404 F. Supp. 841, 847 (N.D. Ala. 1975); State v. Kahout, 198
Neb. 90, 251 N.W.2d 723, 725 (1977); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 253, 360 N.E.2d 935, 943, 392
N.Y.S.2d 257, 264 (1976). Regarding factual errors in progress reports, see United States v. Dalia, 426 F.
Supp. 862, 867-70 (D.N.J. 1977), affd, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir.), affd, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
193. Two widely cited cases provide clear examples. In United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
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C. THE COURT'S MINIMIZATION ANALYSIS IN SCOTT

The government in Scott conceded that at least 60 percent of the
intercepted conversations proved to be nonpertinent, but argued that interception of these telephone calls was reasonable under the circumstances of the
case. 194 The Court noted that in a complex case such as Scott, involving a
1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
952 (1975), the Second Circuit, in upholding the total interception of all 2,000 calls, emphasized that the
district judge had "closely and conscientiously supervised" the taps, 485 F.2d at 501. Yet, as Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent from the denial of certiorari, the supervising attorney ignored the
monitoring instructions given by the judge, instead issuing his own contradictory instructions to the
monitoring agents; furthermore, the judge was not informed that every conversation, including at least 42
arguably privileged attorney-client conversations, was being fully recorded. 423 U.S. at 952-56. Similarly,
in United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), judicial supervision was
cited approvingly by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit even though
"the supervising judge was never specifically informed that the agents were not minimizing the interception
of any conversations." 516 F.2d at 759.
194. At the second suppression hearing in district court, the government offered the following
statistical "call analysis" of the intercepted conversations:

Number of
Conversations

Percentage of Total
Interceptions

NS-Communications
which in substance
relate to the
narcotics enterprise

126

32.8

NB-Communications
which relate to the
narcotics enterprise
in part

7

Category

1.8

ME-Communications
not concerned with
the narcotics enterprise
but nonetheless of
important evidentiary
value

21

5.4

A-Communications so
ambiguous that their
purpose cannot be
determined

142

36.9

R-Communications
consisting totally
of a recorded message

27

7.0

UNRE-Communications
which are unrelated to the
narcotics enterprise
but which were intercepted
with a reasonable expectation
of related material

55

14.3
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wide-ranging conspiracy with a large number of participants, an experienced
monitor would have found it difficult to determine the relevancy of many of
these calls prior to their completion. 195 The Court stated that the majority of
the nonpertinent interceptions were either one-time conversations or were so
brief or so ambiguous that the agents had little opportunity to develop a
category of innocent calls.196 The Court discussed in detail only seven
conversations between Jenkins and her mother, and found that although these
conversations ultimately proved immaterial, they contained references that
197
could have been interpreted as relevant at the time.
The Court's analysis in Scott appears to have been based on the assumption
that in complex cases effective minimization and successful investigations are
mutually exclusive. This assumption, like the Court's interpretation of
congressional intent, 198 is incorrect. It cannot be contested that the nature and
use of the facilities or premises being monitored, the goals of the investigation,
the scope of criminal activity involved, the government's initial expectations,
and the use of codes or cryptic jargon have substantial impact upon the degree
to which minimization can be achieved. 199 Nevertheless, it appears that some
courts, including the Supreme Court in Scott, have been too willing to cite
these factors to justify a failure to minimize, without analyzing whether these
factors were present to such an extent that minimization was completely
impossible. 200 There is ample evidence that such complexities do not render
minimization impossible, if monitors make a good-faith effort to achieve it.201
UN-Communications which
are unrelated to the
narcotics enterprise and
which were intercepted with
no reasonable expectation
of related material
Total Interceptions

6

1.56

384

Scott v. United States, 516 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
195. 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
196. Id. at 141-42.
197. Id. at 142. The rationale for this conclusion is discussed at note 164 supra.
198. See notes 136-42 & accompanying text supra.
199. Having supervised the execution of 40 wiretaps and bugs, the author is well aware of the legal and
practical demands that minimization imposes upon the monitoring agents. An individual monitor must
decide from conversation to conversation and from second to second whether to listen and record, or to
minimize.
200. Admittedly, it may not be possible to evaluate the complexities of a given case solely from the facts
included in a reported opinion. The only opinion, however, that in the author's view, sets forth concrete
facts justifying prolonged total interception is United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974), where the telephone was, in the words of one conspirator, strictly a "business
phone," everyone who used the telephone was involved in narcotics traffic, 70% of the calls were related to
narcotics, and only 12% involved neither narcotics nor other criminal activity. 494 F.2d at 1021-23.
201. See United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); United
States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978); United States v. Scully,
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IV. THE SUPPRESSION REMEDY
Judicial approaches to minimization have been far from uniform. There is
general agreement that the ultimate issue is whether the minimization
procedures followed by the monitoring agents were reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances of the investigation. 202 Consequently, litigation has
focused on three basic elements: (1) the procedures that were followed, (2) the
extent to which interceptions were minimized, and (3) the underlying facts
and circumstances. Beyond this general framework, however, it is difficult to
synthesize a prevailing approach. There is disagreement over who has
standing to contest an alleged failure to minimize. No procedural guidelines
have been established for hearings on the minimization issue, 203 and courts
differ substantially on the appropriate remedy to be applied once the hearing
judge has concluded that the monitors' conduct was unreasonable.
A. STANDING TO CONTEST AN ALLEGED FAILURE TO MINIMIZE

Two federal courts have reached different conclusions regarding standing
to contest an alleged failure to minimize the interception of nonpertinent
conversations. The Second Circuit has ruled that only those persons who have
a privacy interest in the residence in which the tapped phone is located have
standing. 204 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, on the other hand, has held that every party to an intercepted
conversation has standing. 20 5 The District of Columbia Circuit has found
further that compliance with the minimization provision must be assessed by
examining "the totality of the monitoring agents' conduct," rather than by
"[flragmenting the. . . inquiry" into an assessment of whether each defendant's conversations were properly minimized. 206 At the hearing, therefore,
each person whose conversations were intercepted must be allowed to
introduce any intercepted conversation in order to show that the conversa546 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other groundssub nor. United States v. Cabral, 431 U.S. 902, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977); United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977); United
States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United States v. Armocida, 515
F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973), all of which are summarized in the Appendix. It thus stretches credibility for the government to
claim in other cases that not a single conversation could safely have been minimized.
202. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978).
203. United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255, 262 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Cabral v. United States, 430 U.S. 902, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977).
204. United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); United States
v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
205. United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.
1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
206. 504 F.2d at 197.
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tions in which he participated were seized in violation of the warrant.20 7 The
court noted, however, that if the monitoring agents failed to minimize

adequately, each defendant could suppress only those conversations in which
he personally participated. 208
B. NATURE AND SCOPE OF MINIMIZATION HEARING

Similarly, the nature and scope of a minimization hearing have not been
defined uniformly by the courts. Several courts have held that the prosecutor
has the initial burden of proving that a reasonable effort was made by the

monitoring agents to minimize the interception of innocent communications.
If the prosecutor makes a prima facie showing of reasonableness, the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that more effective minimization

procedures could have been used that nevertheless would have enabled the
government to accomplish its surveillance goals. 209 Beyond the allocation of

burdens of proof, however, the only general principle that has emerged is that
the length and scope of the hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial
210
judge.
C. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES IN MINIMIZATION PROCEEDINGS

The courts also disagree on the appropriate remedy for excessive monitor-

ing. Two approaches have emerged. Some courts have effectively ignored the
failure to minimize, holding that while nonpertinent conversations should be
suppressed, pertinent conversations should not. 211 This approach affords a
207. Id.
208. Id. Although the standing question was raised, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the matter
in Scott, 436 U.S. at 135 n.10. The Ninth Circuit likewise has noted the issue but has declined to decide it.
United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978).
209. United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975). See also
United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 880-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v.
Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Losing,
539 F.2d 1174, 1179-81 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245,
250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976). But see Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 100-01, 338
A.2d 284, 291 (1975) which, under the facts, appears to have placed far too heavy a burden on the
defendant.
210. See United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977);
United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255, 262 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on othergrounds sub nom. United States
v. Cabral, 430 U.S. 902, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977). In some cases, minimization hearings have lasted
several days. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(four days), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973)(four days), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), affd, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 952 (1975); United States
v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 540 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (five days), rev'd on othergrounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973). In other cases, courts have held that it was not necessary to conduct a
hearing at all. See. e.g., United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cirillo,
499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); State v. Brauenig, 122 N.J. Super. 319,
328-29, 300 A.2d 346, 350-51 (App. Div. 1973).
211 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 760 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 436 U.S. 128
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defendant no real remedy: it hardly benefits the accused if the judge
suppresses only those conversations that the prosecutor had no intention of

using against him. 212 Moreover, if only improperly intercepted nonpertinent
conversations are suppressed, the minimization provision will be stripped of
2 13

all deterrent effect.
Other courts have held that application of the suppression remedy depends
upon whether a good-faith effort was made to minimize interception of
nonpertinent conversations. Where monitors blatantly disregard the
minimization provision, all conversations, pertinent as well as nonpertinent,
must be suppressed. 2 4 On the other hand, where a good-faith attempt was
made, but the judge concludes that the effort was inadequate, the use of
pertinent conversations and derivative evidence at trial should be permitted. 215 This emphasis on the good faith of the monitoring officers is the
(1978), and cases cited therein. "This argument is often supported by reference to the law with regard to
other sorts of search warrants, which suppresses only seized items not covered by the warrant, but does not
require suppression of items properly seized." United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1139 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977). However, analogies to physical searches and seizures are
inapposite. See text accompanying notes 20-37 supra.
212. A few courts have suggested that the only remedy is a civil suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1976), which creates a civil cause of action for victims of illegal eavesdropping. See, e.g., United States v.
Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974). The Supreme Court,
however, has long since rejected the proposition that the opportunity to seek civil damages is an adequate
remedy for the victim of an unlawful search, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961), although this
proposition has recently won new advocates, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
421-22 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Further § 2520 provides that "[a] good faith reliance on a court
order. . . shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under [Title III] or
under any other law."
No reported civil actions have been brought successfully where eavesdropping, however excessive, was
authorized by warrant. At least one court, however, has concluded that Scott is a double-edged sword. In
Higgens v. Fuessenich, 452 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Conn. 1978), Connecticut officials in 1972 obtained a wiretap
and, in accord with then-existing departmental procedures, recorded every conversation (except privileged
communications) for the duration of a ten-day warrant. Plaintiffs subsequently sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 2520, alleging that excessive monitoring violated their civil rights. Defendants
moved for summary judgment, citing the good-faith provision of § 2520. The district court denied the
motion. Citing Scott, the court held that the issue was whether the minimization procedures followed were
objectively reasonable, and that this issue could only be decided by a jury. The district court appears to
have read the explicit "good faith reliance" provision out of § 2520, just as the Supreme Court read the
implicit good-faith effort requirement out of the minimization provision.
213. "Knowing that only 'innocent' calls would be suppressed, the government could intercept every
conversation during the entire period of a wiretap with nothing to lose by doing so since it would use at trial
only those conversations which had definite incriminating value anyway ..
" United States v. Focarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), quoted with approval in United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d
1132, 1140 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
214. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974); People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 4147, 364
N.E.2d 132, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1977).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1141 (2d Cir. 1976)(dictum), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 905 (1977); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.)(dictum), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996
(1975); United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Fla. 1972)(dictum); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d
15, 21 (Fla. 1974)(dictum); People v. Brenes, 42 N.Y.2d 4147, 364 N.E.2d 132, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629
(1977)(dictum).
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most logical approach to minimization; whether it will survive the reasoning
of Scott v. United States is, unfortunately, uncertain. 216

V.

OBSERVATIONS AND SOLUTIONS

If the only purpose of Title III had been to assist law enforcement officials
to ferret out crime, the logical procedure would be to intercept and record
every conversation, in order to protect against the possibility that a seemingly
innocent conversation might suddenly become, or in retrospect prove to be,
pertinent to the investigation. Title III, however, was enacted with a second,
equally important purpose: to protect the privacy of innocent persons and
innocent conversations. 2 7 This latter purpose is mandated, not only by sound
policy, but by the fourth amendment.
Among the provisions designed to effectuate the second purpose is a
statutory requirement that eavesdropping warrants contain "a particular
description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted." 21 8 This
requirement parallels the fourth amendment provision that all search warrants "particularly describe. . . the thing to be seized." 219 Yet the statutory
particularity provision would be of little import if monitors routinely were
permitted to intercept every conversation in full. To avoid this unconstitutional anomaly, Title III requires each eavesdropping warrant to contain a
directive that those conducting the eavesdropping minimize the "aural
acquisition ' 220 of conversations "not otherwise subject to interception." 221 If
it is to have any meaning at all, the phrase "not otherwise subject to
interception" must refer to conversations not "particularly described" in the
warrant. 222
216. In Scott, the Supreme Court held that good faith on the part of the monitors was irrelevant in
assessing whether the minimization provision had been violated but suggested that if a judge concluded it
had been, the motives that prompted the monitors' actions might be relevant in "determining whether
application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate." 436 U.S. at 139 n.13. The Court, however, expressly
declined to rule on what the remedy for excessive monitoring should be. Id. at 135.
217. See text accompanying note 8-9 supra.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c) (1976).
219. "[T]he [warrant] will link up specific person, specific offense, and specific place. Together they are
intended to meet the test of the Constitution that electronic surveillance techniques be used only under the
most precise and discriminate circumstances, which fully comply with the requirement of particularity." S.
REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 102, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2191.
The Title III particularity provisions must be read in light of United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143
(1974). Kahn held that monitoring agents are entitled to intercept crime-related conversations even if none
of the participants is identified in the warrant as a person "whose communications are to be intercepted
.... Id. at 152. In effect, Kahn rules that the particularity requirement goes only to the subject matter of
the communications, not to the identity of the participants.
220. "Intercept" is defined as the "aural acquisition" of the contents of a wire or oral communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
222. In United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1974), the Court rejected the argument that
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At least until patterns of innocent conversations emerge, it may be
impossible for an officer to be certain whether a conversation is pertinent to
an investigation until after the conversation has been completed. Inevitably,
some innocent conversations will be intercepted. 223 The more complex an
investigation, the more necessary and reasonable it is to listen and record
extensively. 224 Nevertheless, there must be a practical deterrent to excessive
monitoring and a practical remedy available to those whose privacy is
provisions
excessively invaded; otherwise, the particularity and minimization
225
of Title III are for all practical purposes nullified.
Judicial interpretation of the minimization directive has virtually eviscerated this central provision of Title 111.226 Even before Scott, several courts had
held that in complex cases, it is reasonable for monitors to intercept every
227
conversation in full until patterns of innocent conversations emerge.
Because the practice of initial, total interception tends to become selfperpetuating and self-justifying, the minimization requirement often has
received little more than lip service. 228 In concluding that the monitors' good
faith or lack thereof is irrelevant in assessing whether the minimization
provision has been adhered to, Scott suggests that even lip service is no longer
necessary. 229 This holding is based upon an explicit interpretation of Title III
and an implicit assumption of fact, both of which are erroneous. The Court
misconstrued congressional intent when it concluded that agents' good-faith
efforts or lack thereof are irrelevant when analyzing whether minimization
procedures are reasonable. 230 It also erred in assuming that complex investigations cannot be conducted effectively under the constraints imposed by
231
minimization procedures.
permitting the monitoring agents to intercept conversations between persons not named in the warrant
would, in effect, authorize a constitutionally impermissible general warrant. "[Tihe order required the
agents to execute the warrant in such a manner as to minimize the interception of any innocent
conversation. . . .Thus, [that the warrant permitted interceptions of conversations between persons not
identified therein] hardly left the executing agents free to seize at will every communication that came over
the wire-and there is no indication that such abuses took place in this case." Id.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Scott, emphasized that in Kahn "the Court relied on the minimization
provision as an adequate safeguard to prevent. . . unlimited invasions of personal privacy." 436 U.S. at
146 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that Scott therefore "undercuts" the reasoning of
Kahn, "which may now require overruling." Id. He also protested that "this process of myopic,
incremental denigration of Title III's safeguards raises the specter that, as judicially 'enforced,' Title III
may be vulnerable to constitutional attack for violation of Fourth Amendment standards, thus defeating
the careful effort Congress made to avert that result." Id. at 148.

223. See notes 85-87, 158-59 & accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 147-201 & accompanying text supra.
225. See notes 211-16 & accompanying text supro.

226. Concerning classification of a Title III provision as "central" to the statute, see notes 53-62 &
accompanying text supra.
227. See note 157 supra.
228. See notes 158-60 & accompanying text supra.
229. See United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 144 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

230. See notes 136-42 & accompanying text supra.
231. See notes 198-201 & accompanying text supra.
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The Supreme Court has held consistently that the "reasonableness" of a
search and seizure is to be measured objectively. 232 "Simple good faith on the
part of the . . . officer is not enough. '233 A purely objective analysis of
reasonableness may be adequate to decide whether an officer was justified in
making an isolated arrest, stop, frisk, search or seizure. Such an analysis,
however, is wholly inadequate when several weeks of continuous, surreptitious interceptions of otherwise private conversations are at issue. 234 Particularly in complex investigations, where the government, with superficial
plausibility can retroactively defend total interception, 235 it is unlikely that
any minimization will be achieved unless a good-faith effort is made to do so.
Logically, therefore, the essential first step in assessing the manner in
which interception was conducted is to ascertain whether monitors have
made a good-faith effort to minimize. 236 If they have not, intercepted
conversations-pertinent as well as nonpertinent-and derivative evidence
should be suppressed. 237 If a court concludes that a good-faith effort was
made, the court should then determine whether that effort was reasonable,
viewing that effort objectively and considering all of the factors that may have
made the task more difficult. 238
Although Scott is founded upon a misinterpretation of Title III and a faulty
assumption of fact, 2 3 9 it nevertheless is law. Corrective legislation is the most
effective solution. The minimization provision should be amended to read:
"Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the
authorization to intercept . . . shall be conducted in a good faith and
reasonable manner in order to minimize the interception of communications
not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter .... "
Short of corrective legislation, there is no single, simple solution to the
problems created by Scott. Nevertheless, the balance between effective law
enforcement and protection of privacy may be regained through the conscientious efforts of law enforcement officials, judges to whom eavesdropping
applications are submitted, and trial and appellate courts.
232. See text accompanying notes 108-17 supra.
233. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
234. See text at notes 20-28 supra.
235. See, eg., note 194 supra.

236. Prior to Scott, several courts had held that whether the monitors made a good-faith effort was
highly relevant in assessing whether their conduct was reasonable. See note 84 supra.
237. We do not enforce the basic premise of [Title III] that
intrusions of privacy must be kept to the minimum by excusing failure of the agent(s) to make
the good-faith effort to minimize which Congress mandated. In the nature of things it is
impossible to know how many fewer interceptions would have occurred had a good-faith
judgment been exercised, and it is therefore totally unacceptable to [excuse the failure to make
that effort simply because of] the difficulty in predicting what might have occurred [had the
mandated good-faith effort been made].
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 145 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
238. See notes 215-16 & accompanying text supra.
239. See text accompanying notes 136-42, 198-201 supra.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:315

A. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

The first line of defense in protecting innocent conversations from excessive
eavesdropping is the intelligent self-interest of law enforcement officials. It
would be unwise for prosecutors and police officers to view Scott as a license
to regard a tap or bug as an open microphone; to do so would be bad policy.
There are many, in and out of Congress, who agree with Justice Holmes that
eavesdropping is a "dirty business," 240 and with Justice Brandeis that "writs
of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wire tapping." 241 If law enforcement officials
ignore the minimization provision, Congress ultimately may conclude that its
attempt in Title III to meet the needs of law enforcement while protecting the
privacy of innocent persons 242 has failed. This could lead to the repeal of Title
III and an end to all eavesdropping and bugging for law enforcement
purposes.
The balance between respect for privacy and the need to ascertain the scope
of, and participants in, a criminal enterprise under investigation is struck best
by spot monitoring. 243 Inevitably, spot monitoring will result in the interception of some nonpertinent matter. Concededly, the procedure also creates the
risk that brief, relevant passages in otherwise irrelevant conversations might
be missed. Yet, spot monitoring significantly minimizes privacy intrusions
while substantially safeguarding against the loss of pertinent evidence. Use of
this technique would demonstrate that the monitors have reasonably complied with restrictions imposed by the fourth amendment, Title III and the
eavesdropping warrant. How long a monitor should listen before deactivating
listening and recording devices, and how long he should wait before a
resumption of listening and recording, are best left to the experience and
instincts of the individual officer. The checks on his discretion are corrective
instructions by the police supervisor, prosecutor or issuing judge if an officer
listens too extensively or does not listen often enough.
B. THE ISSUING JUDGE

The second line of defense against excessive interception is the issuing
judge. Title III authorizes the judge to issue an eavesdropping warrant "as
requested or as modified .....
244 Even in the absence of a statutory
amendment, the issuing judge should include a good faith requirement in the
warrant itself.245 Further, an issuing judge should insist that the attorney
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
Spot monitoring is described in the text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976) (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
Such a provision might read: "The law enforcement officials who execute this warrant are hereby
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supervising the investigation issue detailed monitoring instructions to the
agents who will execute the warrant, 246 and should be exceedingly reluctant to
permit total interception of all conversations at the outset of monitoring. 247
Unless a compelling need for total initial interception is set forth in the
application or in a recorded, ex parte proceeding prior to issuance of the
warrant, the judge should insist that monitors only spot monitor conversations that do not appear to be pertinent to the goals of the investigation. 248
Once monitoring begins, the judge should oversee the execution of the
warrant by requiring periodic reports, specifying both the percentage of
conversations intercepted in full and the number of such calls considered
pertinent to the investigation. 249 He or she should randomly examine the
transcripts of conversations categorized as pertinent, and demand an explanation if the relevance of such conversations is not readily apparent. In addition,
he should make unannounced visits to the listening post for a firsthand view
of how monitoring is being conducted. 250
C. TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS

The final line of defense for conversational privacy is in the trial and
appellate courts. State courts in interpreting their own constitutions and
instructed to make a reasonable and good-faith effort to minimize the interception of conversations other
than those specifically described herein." Appellate courts may reject an issuing judge's attempt to write
into a warrant a requirement that the Supreme Court has read out of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3),
however, authorizes an issuing judge to issue a warrant, "as requested or as modified ....
" A
modification designed to enforce respect for privacy is certainly consistent with the spirit and letter of Title
III,
Inclusion of a good-faith requirement in the warrant would free the minimization issue from the purely
"objective," ex post facto analysis endorsed in Scott. Title III sets forth three grounds upon which an
aggrieved party may seek suppression, see note 54 supra; the third is that "the interception was not made in
conformity with the warrant." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I0)(a)(iii) (1976). If monitors fail to make a good-faith
effort to minimize, every interception would violate the warrant, and pertinent as well as nonpertinent
conversations would be subject to suppression.
246. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 33, at § 160; NWC Staff STUDIES AND SURVEYS, supra note 91, at
289-90 & 356-57.
247. See text accompanying notes 157-62 supra.
248. See text accompanying notes 84-87 & 243 supra.
249. Congress intended ongoing judicial oversight to be a significant check against excessive interception. See notes 186-89 & accompanying text supra. In some cases, however, judicial supervision of
eavesdropping has been ineffective in checking possible abuses. See notes 190-93 & accompanying text
supra.
250. It may appear that judicial visits to the listening post would accomplish little more than to assure
proper minimization while the judge is present. The author's experience indicates, however, that where
monitors know that the judge may make such visits, they attempt to minimize throughout the
investigation. Not only does the judge's interest underscore the importance of minimization, but also the
officers realize that they are more likely to perform properly under judicial scrutiny if they have been
performing properly all along.
Some might find this level of judicial involvement objectionable, on the ground that the judge might
become a participant in the investigation and lose his neutral, detached role. Active judicial oversight,
however, is an integral aspect of the congressional scheme to limit intrusion of privacy. See text
accompanying notes 186-89 supra.
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statutes may refuse to follow Scott.251 In addition, state and federal courts
may begin to analyze more critically the "objective" reasonableness of the
monitors' conduct. 252 In this task, defense counsel must play a major part.253
The judge should require the prosecutor to submit a statistical analysis of all
intercepted conversations, 254 and to identify each conversation in each
category. Tapes should be made available to the defense counsel who could
listen to each conversation, and request that the judge listen to any
conversation which arguably has been misclassified. 255 Similarly, counsel
should attempt to discern any patterns of innocent conversations which
should have been noticed by the monitoring agents. 256 Where appropriate,
individual monitors should be required to testify as to why a particular
conversation was intercepted.
Such procedures would serve as a deterrent to excessive monitoring by
ensuring that both the good faith and the reasonableness of monitors are
subjected to close scrutiny. As in Terry v. Ohio,257 the monitors would be
required to point to "specific and articulable facts" 258 that justify the
interception of any conversation. 259 Excessive and unjustified interception of
nonpertinent conversations should result in the suppression of pertinent
conversations.

251. Prior to Scott, several state courts had held that good faith was an essential ingredient to the
minimization of nonpertinent interceptions. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d
935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976)(statute requires a good-faith and reasonable effort to minimize
nonpertinent calls); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224 n.22, 327 N.E.2d 819, 942 n.22 (1975)
(minimization requirement not necessarily violated by listening to some nonpertinent conversations as long
as good-faith effort made); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 101, 338 A.2d 284, 291 (1975)(good faith a factor in
determining whether minimization requirement met); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla.
1974)(interception of some nonpertinent calls permissible so long as good-faith effort made).
252. "[We] ... have little doubt that as a practical matter the judge's assessment of the motives of the
officers may occasionally influence his judgment regarding the credibility of the officers' claims" that
minimization would have been impossible to achieve in any event. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139
n.13 (1978).
253. For a more detailed discussion, see FISHMAN supra note 33 at §§ 285, 288-89 (1978).
254. See the government's statistical analysis in Scott, supra note 194.
255. For example, the government might seek to justify the interception of a particular conversation on
the ground that it was too ambiguous for an on-the-spot decision to minimize. If later evaluation of the
conversation shows that it was both clear and obviously nonpertinent, this should be brought to the trial
judge's attention.
256. For example, the government may justify interception of a conversation because one or more
participants have not been identified. If counsel can direct the judge's attention to several previous
conversations between the same individuals which were obviously nonpertinent, the government's
classification of the conversation is unjustified. Similarly, counsel should be alert to any conversations in
which children participate or which involve potentially privileged relationships, such as those between a
suspect (or an unknown) and an attorney, doctor, etc.
257. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
258. 1 Id. at 21.
259. The factors that make minimization difficult, if actually present, clearly would serve as adequate
reasons for listening to nonpertinent conversations. See notes 151-71 & accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION

In Scott v. United States, 260 the Supreme Court departed significantly from
prior constitutional principles and negated congressional intent by eliminating good faith as a factor to be considered in evaluating compliance with the
minimization provision. In doing so, it has paid unwarranted and unnecessary
deference to the needs of law enforcement at the expense of the privacy rights
of individuals. By its very nature, electronic surveillance represents an
enormous intrusion into heretofore inviolate areas. That intrusion can be
justified only to gather evidence of crimes that are difficult to detect and
prosecute by other investigative techniques. For thirty years after electronic
surveillance was technically possible, it was a forbidden weapon in the law
enforcement arsenal. It was only the pervasive and insidious nature of
organized crime that prompted Congress to permit its use under highly
circumscribed conditions.
Title III represented Congress' effort to balance the needs of effective law
enforcement and the protection of individual privacy. Experience and common sense demonstrate that effective use of electronic surveillance and
protection of individual privacy can coincide if, and only if, the monitoring
agents make a good faith effort to minimize the interception of nonpertinent
conversations. Congress must now act to make the good faith requirement
explicit. Until such legislation is passed, law enforcement officials, judges who
issue eavesdropping warrants and courts that rule on the admissibility of
evidence obtained through electronic surveillance must work to maintain this
balance. It is only through such efforts that the damage done in Scott can be
minimized.
260. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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APPENDIX1
Case

Crime Investigated

Number of
Duration of
Defendants Indicted Eavesdropping

Extent of Minimization

Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128 (1978)

Narcotics

14

United States v. Abascal,
564 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1977, cert. denied, 435
U.S. 953 (1978)
United States v. Losing,
560 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied434 U.S. 969
(1977). See also 539 F.2d
1174 (8th Cir. 1976)
United States v. Clerkley,
556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 390 (1978)
United States v. Hinton,
543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976)
United States v. Daly,
535 F.2d 434 (8th
Cir. 1976)
United States v. Kirk,
534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 907 (1977)
United States v. Chavez,
533 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S.
911 (1976)
United States v. Turner,
528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S.
996 (1975)

Narcotics

5

12 days on
each of 2
telephones

Narcotics

16

12-13 days

Gambling

14

Narcotics

18

Mail fraud

4

Narcotics

9'

20 days on each
of 2 telephones

2,918 calls intercepted; 130 calls
minimized

Narcotics

14

9h days

All 290 calls intercepted in full; 180
calls nonpertinent

Narcotics

16

10

United States v. Armocida,
515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S.
858 (1975)

Narcotics

United States v. Quintana,
508 F.2d 867
(7th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Capra,
501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
(1974).cert denied,420
U.S. 990 (1975)

Narcotics

15

Narcotics

76

United States v. James,
494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1020 (1974)
United States v. Manfredi,
488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 936 (1974)

Narcotics

30 days

1,208 calls, 33%
pertinent. Many nonpertinent calls less than
2-3 minutes long,'
80 calls minimized
20 days
Some minimization on
(wiretap and bug) wiretap; total interception but not total
recording on bug
60 days on I
All calls monitored;
telephone, duration after 5 minutes,
of tap on 2d
nonpertinent calls
telephone unclear minimized
30 days on each
Over 90% of
of 3 telephones
calls minimized

30 days on

1,259 calls; 670

each of 4
telephones

calls less than I
minute long; 185 of the
remainder minimized;
22% of the fully intercepted calls nonpertinent
835 calls intercepted; 500 calls

l7dayson
each of 2
telephones

Narcotics

55

22

384 calls, 2 40% perttnent, no attempt to
minimize; all calls intercepted in full
All calls intercepted
and recorded in full

35 days on
each of 2
telephones'
2 months on I
telephone, 1
month on 2d
telephone
40 days on
I telephone,
19 days on 2d
telephone
59 days on I
telephone, 39
days on 2d
telephone

minimized; 176 calls
pertinent to narcotics
or criminal activity
2,000 calls all
intercepted in full; only
153 calls pertinent
1,159 calls intercepted; 751 calls intercepted in full, of

which 620 did not
exceed 2 minutes
5,000 calls, all intercepted in full; only
12% involved no

criminality
1,595 calls intercepted in full. Of
more than 1,000 calls
recorded on the long
tap, only about 150 were

pertinent
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Crime Investigated

Extent of Minimization

5 weeks on I
telephone, 3
weeks on 2d
telephone

2,058 calls intercepted in full; about
10% recorded automatically, 73 of which
clearly involved nonpertinent conversations
(babysitter)

9

149dayson
each of 2
telephones

Narcotics

2

2 weeks

Bookmaking

1

24 days

Narcotics

1

107 days

All calls monitored initially; some nonpertinent calls recorded,
but number found to
be de minimis
All calls monitored;
only pertinent calls
recorded
All calls during 5-hour
daily period recorded;
pertinent calls, totalling 2 hours, rerecorded
Calls intercepted during
of the period
authorized- 85% of
these minimized

United States v. Bynum,
485 F2d 490 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated on other
groundt 417 U.S. 903,
aff'd on rehearing, 386 F.
Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd,513 F.2d
533 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied. 423 U.S. 952
(1975)

Narcotics

United States v. Tortorello,
480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.),
cerL denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973)

Mail&Securities
Fraud

Spease v. State.
275 Md. 88. 338
A.2d 284 (1975)
State v. Dye,
60 NJ. 518, 291
A.2d 825, cert
denied. 409 U.S. 1090
(1972)
People v. Floyd,
4 N.Y.2d 245, 360
N.E.2d 935, 392
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1976)

Duration of
Number of
Defendants Indicted Eavesdropping
14

'This appendix includes major minimization cases cited in this article. In each case, the court concluded that the
monitoring agents had complied reasonably with the minimization provision of Title III. Unless otherwise indicated, the
information presented can be found by referring to the opinion(s) cited. Most of these cases involved the use of wiretaps
rather than bugs.
'The number of calls noted ordinarily reflects the number of "completed" calls made; that is, the calls reaching wrong
numbers, busy signals, or recordings are ordinarily eliminated from the total call figure.
'Calls of short duration are significant in that it may be impossible to determine their pertinence and terminate
monitoring before the call is completed. Minimization of such calls is often a practical impossibility.
'The taps in Kirk produced evidence leading to the tap in Losing, supra.
'The latter 15 days were pursuant to an invalid extension of the warrant period.
'The opinion lists 6 defendants; a 7th defendant had not been arrested at that point (personal knowledge of author).
'Some conversations were supressed on other grounds.

